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INTRODUCTION
The importance of judicial independence from executive and leg-
islative control is a deeply held tenet of American democracy. The
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and some of the
most important early writings on the American constitutional system
stress the importance of an independentjudiciary. ChiefJustice John
Marshall espoused:
The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's fire-
side: it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all .... will you
allow a Judge to give a decision when his office may depend upon it?
when his decision may offend a powerful and influential man?... If they
may be removed at pleasure, will any lawyer of distinction come upon
your bench? No, sir. I have always thought, from my earliest youth till
now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an
ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a de-
pendent Judiciary.'
The question of the influence upon the judiciary that the execu-
tive or legislative branches may gain through recess appointments has
reemerged as a public concern following the recess appointments of
Judge Pickering to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals andJudge Pryor
to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Not since the Eisenhower
recess appointments of the 1950s has so much attention been focused
on the constitutionality and practical consequences of these ap-
pointments.
. Law Clerk to the Honorable Joel M. Flaum, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. B.S., Cornell University, 2002; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2005. I benefited greatly
from the opportunity to work on the practical application of this topic with Professor Laurence
Tribe. I'm grateful for the guidance of Professor Heather Gerken, whose repeated readings
and insightful comments were invaluable. I'm also thankful for the editing, comments, and
patience of Merritt Singleton. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those
of the author.
Jefferson B. Fordham & Theodore H. Husted, Jr., John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 57, 61 (1955) (quoting PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE
CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 615-19 (1830)).
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This essay contributes to the understanding of recess appoint-
ments in three areas. First, Part I of this article contains a thorough
historical analysis of Attorney General Opinions discussing the consti-
tutionality and proper use of judicial appointments. In Part II, these
executive branch opinions are complemented by an exploration of
congressional responses. Part III of this article contains an evaluation
of judicial statements and practice, as well as an extensive analysis of
the conflict between Article III's judicial protections and the Recess
Appointments Clause. Finally, Part IV of this article presents a new
lens through which to view recess appointments. From both a legal
and political science perspective, recess appointments can be seen as
transforming the Senate from an ex-ante evaluator of a nominee's
potential to an ex-post assessor of a judge's performance. Part IV also
explores the political implications and impact upon the separation of
powers caused by this shift.
Article II of the Constitution announces the method by which
judges will ascend to office. The President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States.
2
Article III of the Constitution guarantees that "The Judges, both
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office.
'3
These two provisions guide the appointment and service of judges
in the federal courts. After being appointed with the "advice and
consent" of the Senate, judicial independence and security is assured
by what is often described as Article III's guarantee of life tenure and
guaranteed compensation.4 Another provision of the Constitution,
however, calls into question not only the appointment process, but
also the necessity of Article III protections for a sitting Federal Dis-
trict CourtJudge, Circuit CourtJudge, or Supreme CourtJustice.
The Constitution describes a process for what have become
known as "recess appointments." Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 of the
Constitution states that: "The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by grant-
ing Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Ses-
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4 See, e.g., Discussion, A Discussion of Judicial Independence with Judges of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 355, 366 (1997) [hereinafter Discussion ofJudi-
cial Independence] (statement of Judge Bobby R. Baldock) ("[The life tenure and guaranteed
compensation provisions permit us to exercise that power independently.").
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sion."5 The proper application and understanding of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause has troubled constitutional scholars, judges, and
litigants for generations.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the inherent
constitutional conflict created by the recess appointment of federal
judges. Can a judge appointed under Article II, Section 2, Clause 3,
without the advice and consent of the Senate, and with a term of of-
fice scheduled to expire at the end of the next session of Congress be
considered an "Article III Judge?''6 Article III mandates that judges
have lifetime tenure and guaranteed compensation. The tenure of a
recess appointee is explicitly limited to the end of the next session of
Congress. It is unclear how a recess appointee can "exercise the judi-
cial power of the United States without violating [A]rticle III.'"7
Additional questions arise from judicial recess appointments.
These questions concern the proper role of the Senate in judicial ap-
pointments, the public and private right to have a case heard by a
judge who possesses lifetime tenure, the potential effects upon sitting
judges who also have nominations pending before the Senate, and
the implications of senatorial review of judicial appointments moving
from ex-ante review to ex-post review. Each of these concerns must
be considered in the legal, political, and academic debate surround-
ing the propriety of recess appointments to the federal judiciary.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. General Historical Precedent
The question of who should have the power to appoint federal
judges initially divided the Framers. Some delegates favored exten-
sive appointments to ensure accountability. Other delegates argued
for legislative control of appointments, fearing that the possibilities
for abuses, such as nepotism, were too high if one person held such
an important power." The compromise reached was intended to
guarantee roles for both the President and Senate, balancing ac-
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
6 The Supreme Court has failed to grant certiorari in the lower court cases that have dis-
cussed this issue. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 125 S. Ct. 1640 (2005) (denying certiorari of case
questioning constitutionality ofJudge Pryor's recess appointment to the Eleventh Circuit).
, Paul Ferris Solomon, Comment, Answering the Unasked Question: Can Recess Appointees Con-
stitutionally Exercise theJudicial Power of the United States, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 631, 633 (1985).
8 See Laura T. Gorjanc, Comment, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back
in Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1435, 1450 (2004) ("[Ihf one person possesses that
power alone, the threat of abuse is extremely high.").
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countability with a check upon power: the President has the absolute
power to nominate, but appointment requires Senate consent.'
The result of this compromise is the "advice and consent" provi-
sion, whose definition has been the subject of much debate in the
context of both appointments and treaty-making.0 From the conven-
tion debates to modern academic discussion, it is clear that there is a
constitutionally mandated role for the Senate in judicial nomina-
tions. The size and character of that role, however, has never been
clearly delineated."l
Recess appointments allow the President to make appointments
without Senate input. To understand the Recess Appointments
Clause, it is important to understand the context in which it was writ-
ten. In the eighteenth century, it was common for the Senate to re-
cess for six to nine months every year. 2 The Framers feared that the
checks and balances placed upon appointments would handicap the
executive branch if the President were unable to "fill vacancies that
occurred during the long intersession recesses when the Senate, with
its members dispersed throughout the country, could not readily re-
convene to provide its advice and consent."2
Historical evidence indicates that the Recess Appointments Clause
was intended as a supplementary procedure, adopted without any in-
tent to supplant the Senate's constitutional role.' Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote that "The relation in which [the Recess Appointments]
[C]lause stands to the other.. . denotes it to be nothing more than a
supplement to the other for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary
method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was
inadequate."
9 See Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 673, 675 (1841) [hereinafter
Power of President to Fill Vacancies (1841)] (discussing the balance of power between the Sen-
ate and the President with regard to judicial appointments).
10 See, e.g., Howard R. Sklamberg, The Meaning of "Advice and Consent": The Senate's Constitu-
tional Role in Treatymaking, 18 MICH.J. INT'L L. 445, 447-50 (1997) (discussing the origins of the
"advice and consent" clause); Scott R. Ryther, Note, Advice and Consent: The Senate's Political Role
in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 411, 411 (examining "[t] he implica-
tions of the 'advice and consent' language ... in light of the origin and history of the constitu-
tional provision").
It See, e.g., Charles Babington, Frist Urges End to Nominee Filibusters, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2005,
at Al (discussing the propriety of filibusters during Senate confirmation proceedings).
12 Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, at 10 (Univ. of
San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 05-26, October 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=621381 ("When the Constitution was written, intersession recesses
regularly lasted between six and nine months.").
13 Michael A. Carrier, Note, When is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2204, 2224-25 (1994).
14 Id. at 2225.
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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One concern of the eighteenth century was that without the Re-
cess Appointments Clause, the Senate would be obliged to remaincontiuallyin . 16
continually in session. Recalling a senator to the capital in the eight-
eenth century might have taken weeks, during which important posi-
tions, such as Secretary of State, Attorney General, and ambassador-
ships, might go vacant. Beginning in 1789, and for the ten following
sessions of Congress, the average length of intersession recesses was
seven months.' Today, Senate recesses are normally four to five
weeks.'8
The Recess Appointments Clause was a practical necessity of its
time, passed without any intent of altering the newly established
nomination and appointment framework. "Modern transportation
and the change in the frequency with which the Senate meets render
the Recess Appointments Clause an anachronism.... It is simply im-
possible to justify modern uses of the Recess Appointments Clause in
terms of its original purpose."""
Established procedures to fill temporary judicial vacancies make
the need for recess appointments even less pressing. When a post is
vacated, other Article III judges, with the protections of lifetime ten-
ure and guaranteed compensation, can fill the vacancy through "in-
ter- and intra-circuit transfers."0 These transfers along with the cus-
tom of retired, "senior" judges hearing cases, allow federal judges
possessing the absolute protections of Article III to hear cases when
judicial vacancies arise, thereby eliminating much of the stress upon
the system.
A major claim by proponents of recess appointments is that his-
torical practice justifies their continued use.2 ' There have been more
than 300 recess appointments to the federal judiciary since 17892
One of the few judicial opinions to examine recess appointments
spoke of "an unbroken acceptance of the President's use of the recess
"6 See id.
,7 William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judicialy, 20 CONST. COMMENT.
515, 515-16 (2004). Each term of Congress, which lasts two years, has one intersession recess
between the customary two sessions of the Congress.
is Id. at 516.
19 Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 454-55 (2005).
20 Mayton, supra note 18, at 516.
21 See generally Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of His-
torical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1758 (1984) (examining the his-
tory of recess appointments and their role in the modem trend ofjudicial appointments).
22 Stuart Buck, et al., Judicial Recess Appointments: A Survey of the Arguments, FEDERALIST SOCY
2 (2004), http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/recapp.pdf.
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power to appoint federal judges by the three branches of govern-
ment.
2 3
Despite the claims of recess appointment advocates, however, the
total number of appointments does not provide a comprehensive
understanding of their use or answer questions regarding their valid-
ity. During the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and
Clinton administrations, only two recess appointments were made to
the federal bench.24 Most of the 300 recess appointments were con-
centrated from 1897-1963. During this sixty-six year period, 200, or
two-thirds of all recess appointments, were made. 5 This historical
survey illustrates that throughout most of U.S. history, including the
founding period, recess appointments to the federal bench were a
rare and disfavored occurrence.
To understand fully the historical practice of recess appointments
to the federal bench, scrutiny beyond a cursory numerical examina-
tion is necessary. It is important to understand not just whether ap-
pointments occurred, but how the appointees responded. The two
most recent recess appointees, Judge Pryor and Judge Pickering, both
appointed by President George W. Bush, heard and decided many
26cases while their nominations were pending before the Senate.
Their decision to hear cases and make decisions prior to Senate
confirmation breaks with historical tradition. The majority of recess
appointees did not hear any cases until a Senate confirmation en-
sured lifetime tenure and guaranteed compensation. In one study of
recess appointments to the lower courts, only thirty-one percent of
294 appointees heard cases prior to confirmation.
A thorough examination of the historical record casts further
doubt upon the Ninth Circuit's assertion of "unbroken acceptance,"
28in United States v. Woodley. The executive branch has repeatedly ex-
pressed doubt over the extent of the recess appointment power.
2 9
The Supreme Court, while never having directly questioned the valid-
23 United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (describing
presidential use, failure of the Supreme Court to object, and Congressional recognition in the
form of legislation providing for the salaries of recess appointees). But see infra note 93 and ac-
companying text; infra Part III.
24 Buck, et al., supra note 22, at 16.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Jamerson v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 410 F.3d 682 (11th Cir. May 27, 2005)
(Pryor,J.); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (Pickering,J.);
United States v. Chavarria, 377 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. July 12, 2004) (Pickering, J.); Bost v. Federal
Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.June 8, 2004) (Pryor, J.). Judge Pickering's nomination
is no longer pending; he has retired from the federal bench. Judge Pryor began serving as a
recess appointee beginning on February 20, 2004; the Senate confirmed him on June 9, 2005.
27 Mayton, supra note 17, at 540.
28 Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1011.
See infra Part II.A.
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ity of recess appointments, has never explicitly approved of the proc-
ess either.3" Many cases challenging the issue of a judge's standing to
hear a case may not have been brought because of an 1899 Supreme
Court decision prohibiting collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a
judge holding authority under the color of law. s1 The assertion that
Congress has accepted the appointment of judges without the advice
and consent of the Senate is also mistaken. The Senate has repeat-
edly voiced its opposition to the recess appointment of temporary
judges."
B. History of Intrasession Recess Appointments
In addition to the general misgivings expressed by scholars and
government actors toward recess appointments, intrasession recess
appointments have been viewed with a particularly skeptical eye. The
most recent intrasession recess appointment to the federal judiciary
occurred when President Bush appointed William H. Pryor to the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on Friday, February 20,
2004, the last business day before the Senate resumed business on
Monday, February 23, 2004. The entire intrasession recess during
which Mr. Pryor was appointed lasted ten days.33
Historical practice and precedent do not support an assertion that
the President has carte blanche to appoint any judge he sees fit at any
time when the Congress is not actively meeting. The first intrasession
recess appointment to an Article III court occurred in 1867; the next
intrasession appointment was eighty years later in 1947. From 1947
to 1954, there were twelve intrasession recess appointments to the
federal bench. Almost fifty years passed between the last intrasession
recess appointment and that of Judge Pryor. In all, there have been
only fourteen intrasession recess appointments to Article III courts.
Before judge Pryor's appointment, only one intrasession Article III
recess appointment had occurred outside the period from 1947-
1954.
Judge Pryor's intrasession recess appointment diverged from his-
torical practice in several important ways. Of the thirteen previous
intrasession recess appointees to the federal bench, none were made
30 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31 ExparteWard, 173 U.S. 452 (1899).
32 See infra Part II.B.
33 See Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit 9 (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/-kennedy/
1 lthCircuit.pdf ("The Senate did not meet for business the day before the holiday weekend
and the four business days afterwards.").
4 Memorandum from Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., to Senate Democratic Policy
Committee (Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with Congressional Research Service).
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during a recess of less than one month. The average length of a re-
cess in which an intrasession recess appointment to the federal bench
was made is more than seventy-one days.3' In addition, only one pre-
vious appointment was to a federal circuit court, every other intrases-
sion recess appointment was to a position in a lower federal court.s6
Intrasession recess appointments are rare even outside the con-
text of Article III courts. "Prior to 1943, only Presidents Andrew
Johnson, Warren G. Harding, and Calvin Coolidge had made such
appointments. Johnson appointed 14 individuals during a single in-
trasession recess, and Harding and Coolidge each appointed one
person in this way. '37 Historical reluctance and infrequency should
cast a spotlight on intrasession recess appointments to the federal
bench. Such appointments should be evaluated to ascertain whether
they represent a legitimate exercise of presidential power.
II. EVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RECESS
APPOINTMENTS TO ARTICLE III COURTS BY THE EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
The Recess Appointments Clause itself allows a great deal of room
for interpretation. The text of the clause provides that: "The Presi-
dent shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session. 3 8 This clause leaves two significant
questions unanswered. First, when does a vacancy "happen during
the Recess?" To constitute an eligible vacancy, must the vacancy first
appear during the recess or may any existing vacancy be filled during
a recess? Second, what constitutes "the Recess?"39 What will distin-
guish a "recess" from an adjournment? These questions form the
specific terms in which the debate over recess appointments tradi-
tionally occurs. In reality, however, a larger separation of powers
question is being debated: the character and breadth of executive
power against the constitutional check of the Senate.
Each of the three branches of government has endeavored to de-
fine the terms at issue in the Recess Appointments Clause. They have
characterized the clause in ways that protect or expand their own in-
stitutional interests while remaining within the constitutional frame-
5 Id.
6 Id.
37 HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS CRS-4 n.7 (Sept. 10, 2002) (on file with Congressional Research Service).
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
The use of the singular form, "the recess" rather than "recesses" or "adjournments" may
relate to the custom of each two-year term of Congress having one extended adjournment,
forming two separate "sessions" of each Congress.
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work. If the term "may happen" and the definition of "the Recess"
are interpreted broadly, executive power will expand at the expense
of the Senate; should the terms be defined narrowly, Senate control
will expand at the expense of the President.
In their examination of unilateral presidential action, political
scientists have observed a historical tendency by Presidents to in-
crease executive power, while Congress and the Courts have been
slow to resist presidential expansionism.4 0 These tendencies have led
"the recess appointments clause [to evolve] from a limited supple-
ment to be used only when necessary to a method of avoiding the
Senate's express constitutional role in the appointments process."4
The ability of the executive branch to expand its power, and the hesi-
tancy of the legislative and judicial branches to push back against this
expansion are rooted in structural constitutional forces.
A. Executive Branch Evaluations of the Power to Make Recess Appointments
to Article III Courts
Successive Attorney General advisory opinions and executive ac-
tions have shown an increasingly expansive view of the recess ap-
pointment power.42 The first official executive branch evaluation of
the recess appointment power was written in 1823. 3 A vacancy in the
position of navy agent at New York expired during the term of the
Senate and remained open during an intersession recess. Attorney
General William Wirt stated that the President could fill the vacancy
if "the public good" or "the safety of the nation, may require it to be
forthwith filled."'
4
[I]f we interpret the word "happen" as being merely equivalent to "hap-
pen to exist," (as I think we may legitimately do,) then all vacancies
which, from any casualty, happen to exist at a time when the Senate can-
not be consulted as to filling them, may be temporarily filled by the
40 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999) (analyzing the President's power to construct law on his own).
41 Stuart J. Chanen, Constitutional Restrictions on the President's Power to Make Recess Appoint-
ments, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 196 (1984).
42 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.
915, 958 n.183 (2005) ("[T] he Office of Legal Counsel tends to take an expansive view of presi-
dential powers." (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers
in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 415-21 (1989))).
43 See Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631 (1823) [hereinafter Execu-
tive Authority to Fill Vacancies (1823)]. Throughout this Section and in other areas of this pa-
per, the recess appointment power is discussed outside the context of Article III courts. Al-
though there are no Article III implications for non-judicial recess appointments, an
understanding of the general operation of the Recess Appointments Clause and its historical
use is an important aid in understanding judicial recess appointments.
" Id. at 633.
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President; and the whole purpose of the constitution is completely ac-S 45
complished.
The crux of this early interpretation was that while the literal lan-
guage of the Constitution may prevent such recess appointments, the
meaning of the clause was to ensure the continuing functioning of
the government. Attorney General Wirt believed his functionalist
construction "cannot possibly produce mischief, without imputing to
the President a degree of turpitude entirely inconsistent with the
character which his office implies .... ",4 The "turpitude" mentioned
by Attorney General Wirt may refer to the "mischief' a President
would cause to the constitutionally mandated confirmation process
by using the recess appointment power to evade or override the Sen-
ate.
Another early proponent of the expansion of the presidential ap-
pointment power was Attorney General Roger Taney, later Chief Jus-
tice Taney. He advised President Jackson that "l[t] he constitution was
formed for practical purposes .... ,4 Under his interpretation, the
Recess Appointments Clause allowed for presidential appointments
in situations where Senate approval was impractical, such as a situa-
tion where "an officer.., die[d] in a distant part of the United
States, and his death [was] not... known at Washington until after
,,41the adjournment ....
Breaking with his predecessors, Attorney General Mason rejected
the expansive, functionalist view of presidential appointment power
in 1845. "If vacancies are known to exist during the session of the
Senate, and nominations are not then made, they cannot be filled by
executive appointments in the recess of the Senate."49 This narrow,
formalist view of the recess appointment power was quickly aban-
doned and has not been followed.
Twenty years after Attorney General Mason's opinion, in 1866, At-
torney General Stanbery justified presidential appointment power in
extremely strong terms. Relying on a practical, functionalist con-
struction of constitutional provisions and a broad reading of the
"Take Care" Clause, 50 he stated, "the President has full and inde-
pendent power to fill vacancies in the recess of the Senate, without
45 Id.
46 Id. at 634.
47 Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 525, 526-27 (1832) [hereinafter
Power of President to Fill Vacancies (1832)].
48 Id. at 527.
49 Appointment ofJudges, &c., for Iowa and Florida, 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 361, 363 (1845).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted .... ").
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any limitation as to the time when they first occurred.' Stanbery's
advisory opinion also allows for the "daisy-chaining" of recess ap-
pointments by the President to completely preclude Senate involve-
ment in the appointment process.52 Stanbery relies upon the tempo-
rary nature of recess appointments and the goodwill and judgment of
the presidency as guards against such abuse of broad appointment
53powers.
Given the choice between the restrictive interpretation of execu-
tive power presented by Attorney General Mason, and the expansive
interpretation offered by Attorney General Wirt, future Attorneys
General followed Attorney General Wirt's advice and relied upon a
practical construction of the Recess Appointments Clause.54 In so do-
ing, presidential appointment power has been expanded.
In 1862, Attorney General Bates extended the advice given by his
predecessors to include Article III courts.55 Neither his opinion nor
any subsequent Attorney General decisions address the potential con-
flict between recess appointments and Article III's guarantees of life-
time tenure and guaranteed compensation.
In 1901, intrasession appointments were formally addressed by the
executive branch. In his advisory opinion to the President, Attorney
General Knox advocated for a restriction on executive power, stating
that the Constitution does not authorize the President to make recess
appointments during any adjournment other than the single recess
occurring between the two sessions of the Senate. 6 The opinion
found the legal and historical precedents devoid of any case "in
which an appointment during a temporary adjournment of the Sen-
51 President's Power to Fill Vacancies in Recess of the Senate, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 32, 42
(1866) [hereinafter President's Power to Fill Vacancies (1866)].
52 Mayton, supra note 18, at 544 (citing id. at 40).
53 President's Power to Fill Vacancies (1866), supra note 51, at 41 ("[T]he safe and only
guard which protects the just rights of the Senate, [is] the express provision that an appoint-
ment made in recess shall only extend until the next session of the Senate.... It is ample provi-
sion to secure the Senate from everything except an abuse by the President. . . of filling vacan-
cies by so exercising them as intentionally to frustrate the intervention of the Senate.")
54 Prior Opinions of the Attorney General support a practical construction of the Recess
Appointments Clause. See, e.g., Power of President to Fill Vacancies (1832), supra note 47;
Power of President to Fill Vacancies (1841), supra note 9 ; Power of President to Appoint to Of-
fice During Recess of Senate, 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 523 (1846) [hereinafter Power of President
(1846)1; Case of the Collectorship of New Orleans, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 449 (1868). See generaUy
President-Recess Appointment-Postmaster, 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 314, 315 (1914) (listing eleven
previous Opinions of the Attorney General allowing recess appointments to vacancies that were
present prior to the end of a Congressional Session).
5 See President's Appointing Power, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 356 (1862) (informing the
President that the recess appointment power "is settled ... as far, at least, as a constitutional
question can be settled, by the continued practice of your predecessors, and the reiterated
opinions of mine").
56 President-Appointment of Officers-Holiday Recess, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 599, 604 (1901).
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ate was involved., 57 If allowed, Attorney General Knox feared that in-
trasession recess appointments could easily spiral out of control and
eliminate Senate confirmation altogether. Knox states, "[i]f a tempo-
rary appointment could in this case be legally made during the cur-
rent adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no reason why such
an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as
from Thursday or Friday until the following Monday."58
Although Attorney General Knox wrote the first opinion to ad-
dress this question directly, the logic of his opinion was consistent
with earlier opinions. In the first Attorney General opinion regard-
ing the general question of filling vacancies, Attorney General Wirt
stated that the question is "the state of things at the point of time at
which the President is called on to act. Is the Senate in session?
Then he must make a nomination to that body. Is it in recess? Then
the President must fill the vacancy by a temporary commission. 59
This hesitancy by the executive branch to increase power over the
appointment of officers stood as official policy until 1921 when At-
torney General Daugherty penned an oft-cited evaluation of presi-
dential recess appointment power. This opinion, emphasizing a
functionalist, practical construction of the Recess Appointments
Clause, stated that the President may make recess appointments dur-
ing a twenty-eight day adjournment. He relied upon the "broad and
underlying purpose of the Constitution," finding "the real question
[to be] ... whether in a practical sense the Senate is in session so that
its advice and consent can be obtained. To give the word 'recess' a
technical and not a practical construction, is to disregard substance
for form.
62
Attorney General Daugherty's remarks are particularly relevant
today. While approving of a recess appointment during a twenty-
eight day adjournment, he noted that a two, five, or ten-day ad-
journment would not permit a recess appointment. He concluded,
"there is a point, necessarily hard of definition, where palpable abuse
of discretion might subject his appointment to review."
3
Modern executive branch evaluations have supported the policy
promoted by the Daugherty opinion, while suggesting that other
branches of government have implicitly affirmed the power of the
President to make recess appointments regardless of when the va-
57 Id. at 602.
58 Id. at 603.
59 Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies (1823), supra note 43, at 633.
60 Executive Power-Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20 (1921).
61 Id. at 25.
62 Id. at 21-22.
63 Id. at 25.
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cancy arose.64 An extremely aggressive position on the question of
recess appointments was adopted by Assistant Attorney General Wil-
liam Barr during the presidency of George H. W. Bush.
Facing a democrat-controlled Senate in the 100th and 101st Con-
gress,65 Barr composed a memorandum entitled "Common Legislative
Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority."66 In this memoran-
dum, Barr characterized attempts to place restrictions on the Presi-
dent's recess appointment power as "dangerous for presidential pow-
ers."67 In his opinion, he explicitly states the need to preserve the
appointment power as a "counterbalance to the power of the Senate.
By refusing to confirm appointees, the Senate can cripple the Presi-
dent's ability to enforce the law. The recess appointment power is an
important resource for the President, therefore, and must be pre-
served."6  This opinion reshaped the purpose of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause from a means of ensuring continuity in govern-
ment to a vehicle for asserting presidential control against a hostile
Congress.69
During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, the Office of Legal
Counsel addressed the issue of intrasession recess appointments
twice. 6 While purporting to rely upon the earlier opinion of Attor-
ney General Daugherty to establish historical practice, these opinions
greatly expanded executive power by concluding that a recess of
eighteen days was sufficient for an intrasession recess appointment,
7
and suggesting that a recess appointment could be made at 11:30
a.m. on the day the Senate was to reconvene at noon from a thirty-
eight day recess.'2 Although these opinions cautioned that, as a mat-
ter of policy, recess appointments should be made as early as possible
during intrasession recesses, such courtesy was not necessary. The
64 See Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 468-70 (1960) (discussing the acquies-
cence to recess appointments by the Congress, federal courts and the Comptroller General); see
also Recess Appointments Issues, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 585, 589 (1982) (noting that the va-
lidity of earlier Attorney General Opinions remains firm despite recent constitutional develop-
ments involving the "pocket veto").
65 Democrats held the majority of Senate seats from 1987 to 1995. See Party Division in
the Senate, 1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/oneitem-and-teasers/
partydiv.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2005). Barr went on to become Attorney General under Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush, serving from 1991-1993.
Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 248 (1989).
67 Id. at 257.
68 Id.
69 See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
70 Intrasession Recess Appointments, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 271 (1989) [hereinafter
Intrasession Recess Appointments (1989)]; Recess Appointments During an Intrasession Re-
cess, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 15 (1992) [hereinafter Recess Appointments (1992)].
71 Recess Appointments (1992), supra note 70, at 15.
72 Intrasession Recess Appointments (1989), supra note 70, at 273.
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authors of these opinions believed the presidential recess appoint-
ment power to be absolute.
In response to these arguments, Senator George J. Mitchell re-
jected the "reversals and inconsistencies" of the "Executive's histori-
cal consideration of the recess appointment power. ... ."" While rec-
ognizing the right of a President to make nonjudicial intersession
recess appointments, Senator Mitchell sharply criticized reliance
upon Attorney General advisory opinions and their promotion of in-
trasession recess appointments.
On the Senate floor, Senator Mitchell sought to introduce an
amicus brief to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
which was evaluating the constitutionality of President Bush's intras-
ession recess appointment of Thomas Ludlow Ashley as a Governor
of the Postal Service.74 Although the brief was never submitted to the
court, its criticism of the Attorney General opinions is poignant. 75 Af-
ter examining the historical progression of these opinions, Senator
Mitchell criticized these executive interpretations as demonstrative of
the risk of constitutional interpretation guided more by institutional self-
interest than by text and purpose. As the unworkability of its earlier at-
tempts to distinguish between intrasession adjournments of different
lengths became apparent in the context of Congress' contemporary
scheduling patterns, the Executive ultimately has come in this case to ad-
vance an interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause that would
eviscerate the central decision that the Framers made about the ap-
pointment of federal officers: that the appointing power should not be
conferred upon the President alone, but should be checked by the Sen-
76
ate.
Despite the complaints by Senate democrats during the previous
republican administration, the Clinton administration signaled its
approval of intrasession recess appointments in an Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum, which stated agreement with the "view that
the President has discretion to make a good-faith determination of
whether a given recess is adequate to bring the Clause into play."77
The Clinton administration also triggered a renewed debate of the
propriety of presidential recess appointments to the federal bench by
appointing Roger Gregory to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit during an intersession recess.78
73 139 CONG. REC. S8544, 8549 (1993) (reproducing a draft of an amicus brief to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia).
74 139 CONG. REC. S8544, 8545 (1993).
75 Id. at 8548-49.
76 Id. at 8549.
77 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 124, 161 (1996).
78 See Remarks on the Recess Appointment of Roger L. Gregory to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and an Exchange With Reporters, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2783 (Dec.
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In statements regarding the recess appointments of Roger Greg-
ory, the Clinton administration justified the use of a recess appoint-
ment to the federal bench using logic inconsistent with earlier under-
standings of the purpose and practical interpretation of the clause.79
The administration believed the appointment was necessary due to
the Senate's refusal to bring the Gregory nomination to a vote. s His-
torical justification was derived from the claim that "Presidents have
often exercised their recess powers to make historic appointments to
bring diversity to the courts."8" President Clinton greatly expanded
presidential power in the area ofjudicial recess appointments, byjus-
tifying his use of a recess appointment in terms of taking action when
a hostile Senate would not, rather than the traditional justification of
the Senate not being in session or available to confirm a nominee.
He also laid the groundwork for the use of recess appointments by
the Bush administration.
Current President George W. Bush made his first recess appoint-
ment to an Article III court on January 16, 2004, during an interses-
sion recess.2 In statements concerning the appointment of Judge
Charles W. Pickering to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the President followed the Clinton administration
model. President Bush did not mention the availability or unavail-
ability of the Senate; instead, the appointment was justified as a re-
sponse to "obstructionist tactics" by democratic senators. " This same
justification was used a month later during an intrasession recess
when William Pryor was appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit.
4
27, 2000) (announcing Gregory's appointment in light of Senate refusal to confirm President
Clinton's earlier nominees).
79 Id. It is important to remember that it was this practical interpretation that allowed recess
appointment in cases where the vacancy did not arise for the first time during the recess. The
position that Judge Gregory now occupies had been vacant for almost ten years before his ap-
pointment.
80 See id. ("Time and again, for 5 years now, I have tried and tried to fill these gaps injustice
and equality [by nominating Roger Gregory]. And time and again, for 5 years now, the Senate
majority has stood in the way.").
81 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMC'NS, FACT SHEET ON APPOINTING GREGORY TO THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS (Dec. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 1883392. Judge Gregory is the first African-
American to sit on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. Thurgood Marshall was a recess
appointment to the Second Circuit, and "[flour of the five first African American appellate
judges were recess appointed to their first Article III position." Id.
82 See Statement on the Recess Appointment of Charles W. Pickering To Serve on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 91 (Jan. 16, 2004)
(announcing Pickering's appointment).
83 Id.
84 See Statement on the Appointment of William H. Pryor, Jr., To Serve on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 259 (Feb. 20, 2004)
(announcing Pryor's appointment).
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Modern presidential interpretation has turned the early Attorney
General opinions on their heads. While continuing to use a practi-
cal/functional construction to allow for recess appointments to va-
cancies that do not technically "happen" during a recess, a literal in-
terpretation of the Senate's "recess" has replaced practical
considerations of Senate availability. President Bush relied upon a
literal interpretation of "recess," ignoring practical Senate availability
for advice and consent when making his appointment of Judge Pryor.
At the same time he made use of the traditional practical interpreta-
tion of "Vacancies that may happen during the Recess" to make an
appointment to a vacancy that had existed prior to the recess. s Thus,
the Pickering and Pryor appointments combined a practical interpre-
tation of "vacancy" with a literal interpretation of a "recess" that was
not considered proper in earlier executive branch analyses of the
clause.
This mixing of practical and literal interpretations to achieve the
desired executive power exhibits the type of "turpitude" Attorney
General Wirt spoke of in 1832. The vacancy to which Judge Pryor was
appointed was only eligible for appointment under a practical read-
ing of "may happen." A consistent practical interpretation would also
have evaluated whether the President was unable to secure "advice
and consent." In Pickering's case, Senate deliberations of the nomi-
nation were ongoing, and many senators expressed their intention to
oppose confirmation. This was not a situation where the President
did not "desire to avoid the controlling action of the Senate," which
was the required standard of an earlier era."
In fulfilling the President's constitutional duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,8 17 the President should not be per-
881mitted to twist the Constitution. In interpreting the sentence, "The
President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate," 9 President Bush used a practical
construction of "may happen" to grant himself the general recess ap-
pointment power over the Eleventh Circuit vacancy, and a literal con-
struction of the term "recess" to allow him to make the appointment
during the short intrasession recess. While scholars and administra-
tion officials may disagree as to whether a practical/functionalist or
85 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
Power of President (1846), supra note 54, at 528 (approving of a recess appointment of a
postmaster and giving the clause practical construction).
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The "Take Care" Clause is mentioned by many Attorney General
Opinions as the reason for the practical construction of the Recess Appointments Clause.
88 This criticism applies to both the Clinton and Bush administrations. I have focused upon
the Bush administration because its actions are more recent and this administration has been
more explicit regarding its intent.
89 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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textual/formalist interpretation is proper, inconsistent interpreta-
tions used to achieve desired ends should be prohibited. The ma-
nipulation of the recess appointment power to avoid the Senate's
constitutional role and achieve the appointment of desired candi-
dates is inconsistent with the spirit of "advice and consent."
B. Congressional Response to Recess Appointments
Since recess appointments are an executive action, the history of
legislative responses to recess appointments is less exhaustive than
the executive branch's history of recess appointment discussion and
evaluation. Congress has very little control over presidential recess
appointments. The legislature can voice disapproval and work with
the President, but there is no law that Congress is capable of passing
to trump a constitutional provision. While restricted in its actions,
Congress has exercised control over recess appointments using the
power most readily available to them: the power of the purse. This
ability to control, through the appropriation or withholding of funds,
has been recognized as "the most important single curb in the Con-
stitution on Presidential power." 90
Despite the claims of Attorneys General that recess appointments
have been sanctioned by "unbroken acquiescence of the Senate,"
tracing the legislative response to recess appointments reveals consis-
tent dissatisfaction by the legislature and many attempts to derail the
practice. 91 The use of Youngstown standards in evaluating executive
power are complicated by constitutional provisions both for and
against the power to make judicial recess appointments. 92 While it is
unclear whether Congress has acted in a way that specifically restricts
presidential power, it has certainly not granted statutory powers to
the President regarding recess appointments.
90 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 101 (13th ed. 1973)
(quoted in GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 234 (Peter L. Strauss et al. eds., Rev.
10th ed. 2003)).
91 Chanen, supra note 41, at 200 (quoting President's Appointing Power, supra note 55, at
356).
92 This discussion uses the framework of presidential power presented by Justice Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring). Presi-
dential action in this area could be considered either part of the twilight of presidential power,
in which Congress has not spoken, or part of the nadir of presidential power, in which the
President is reliant upon Article II powers to trump congressional action. The Youngstown
analysis presented in some discussions is of questionable use given that the recess appointment
conflict involves an explicit Article II provision that would establish absolute presidential power
against an explicit Article III provision, which would limit presidential power regardless of con-
gressional acquiescence. See Curtis, supra note 21, at 1781-82 (arguing that congressional ac-
quiescence in or approval of a President's use of executive power should allow courts to legiti-
mately infer that such use of power is part of the structure of our government).
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The "unbroken acquiescence of the Senate" repeatedly cited by
Attorney General and judicial opinions was actually broken for the
first of many times in 1813. °  The Senate protested President Madi-
son's appointment of commissioners to negotiate peace with Great
Britain. This protest took the form of a resolution as well as a Senate
Committee Report declaring that the President may only make recess
appointments to "offices that became vacant during the Senate Re-
cess. '" 4 The report's findings were based on the Constitution as well
as past exceptions to the general rule "in which the Senate had
granted the President special authority to fill vacancies in offices that
Congress had created at the very end of its session. 9 5 If the Senate
believed that the President already possessed the power to make
these appointments, no special provisions would have been necessary.
In 1863, Congress attempted to limit the use of the recess ap-
pointment power by prohibiting payment to recess appointees who
were appointed to vacancies that existed prior to a recess.9 6 As part of
an appropriations package, it was enacted that:
[N]o money shall... be paid out of the Treasury, as salary, to any person
appointed during the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in any existing
office, which vacancy existed while the Senate was in session and is by law
required to be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
until such appointee shall have been confirmed by the Senate.9 7
The intent of the legislature in 1863 was very clear. As Senator Fes-
senden opined, by prohibiting the payment of recess appointees to
positions in which the Senate had an opportunity to provide advice
and consent but had chosen to remain silent, Congress "will probably
put an end to the habit of making such appointments. '"9 s
By prohibiting payment to recess appointees Congress implicitly
admits the existence of such appointments. This acknowledgment,
however, is not equivalent to a recognition of constitutionality. Ac-
ceptance of constitutionality cannot be extrapolated from a congres-
93 Chanen, supra note 41, at 200.
Id. at 201 (citing T. SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 373 (2d ed. 1830)) (summarizing
the Senate Committee Report of April 25, 1822).
95 Id.
96 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 25 (Comm. Print 1959) (reprinting the 1863 bill and quoting from Senator Trumbull,
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 565 (1863)).
97 Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 646 (1863), amended by Act ofJuly 11, 1940, R.S. § 1761,
54 Stat. 751 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 56 (2000)). Beginning in 1940 and in subse-
quent versions of the law, some exceptions to the general prohibition were allowed. The cur-
rent law is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2000).
98 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 96, at 26 (quoting Senator Fessenden,
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 565 (1863)).
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sional decision to operate within the constraints of current constitu-
tional interpretation.
Congressional attempts to control general presidential appoint-
ment power have also implicated the recess appointment power and
given Congress, and the Senate in particular, a greater opportunity to
advance its interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause.' 0 By
defining "recess" and limiting payments to recess appointed officers,
Congress has been able to limit the President's ability to fill vacancies
outside of a Senate-defined recess.101
Congress has also repeatedly endorsed the importance of lifetime
tenure for judges of the lower federal courts. By echoing the consti-
tutional protections of lifetime tenure in a statute, providing that
judges "shall hold office during good behavior," Congress implicitly
recognizes the importance of lifetime tenure, and provides a statutory
bar in addition to the existing constitutional bar against temporary
judges.
0 2
The definition of the term "recess" figures prominently in the de-
bate about when a presidential recess appointment may occur. In a
1905 report by the Committee on the Judiciary, the Senate sought to
define what constitutes a recess, and to enunciate the powers and
limitations of the President during a Senate recess. 03 The Senate re-
port was prepared in response to a letter from the Secretary of War,
Elihu Root. In this letter, the Secretary advanced a claim of a "con-
structive recess," during which the President could fill vacancies for
military officers. 0 4 Senator Tillman submitted a report to the Senate
from the Judiciary Committee, sharply criticizing the concept of a
"constructive recess," and clarifying that the Senate is in recess when
it is in no position to exercise advice and consent. The report stated:
99 But see Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 466 (1960) ("5 U.S.C. 56, which
originally prohibited the payment of appropriated funds as salary to a person who received a
recess appointment if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session implicitly assumed
that the power existed, but sought to render it ineffective by prohibiting the payment of the
salary to the person so appointed").
100 See, e.g., Tenure of Office Act of 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (defining the Presi-
dent's power to make recess appointments), repealed by 24 Stat. 500 (1887).
101 See 5 U.S.C. § 3349 (1982) (using the phrase "a vacancy occurring during a recess of the
Senate," rather than the constitutional phrase "may happen during the Recess of the Senate," to
restrict the recess appointment power), repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 151, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998).
102 28 U.S.C. § 44(b) (2000) ("Circuit judges shall hold office during good behavior."); 28
U.S.C. § 134(a) (2000) ("The district judges shall hold office during good behavior.").
10s S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON "RECESS OF THE SENATE," ETC., S. REP. No. 4389
(1905).
IG4 ELIHU ROOT, LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF WAR SUBMITTING THE VIEWS OF THE
DEPARTMENT IN REGARD TO WHAT IS CALLED A "CONSTRUCTIVE RECESS," S. DOC. NO. 58-147, at
1 (1904).
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The framers of the Constitution were providing against a real dan-
ger ... not an imaginary one. They had in mind a period of time during
which it would be harmful if an office were not filled; not a constructive,
inferred, or imputed recess, as opposed to an actual one....
[In the situation at hand,] [t]here was no "recess" within the letter or
spirit of the Constitution, and therefore there was no right to issue com-
missions and induct the officers commissioned into office.
10 5
By asserting its right to define the "recess," the Senate was able to
limit the President's power to appoint officers who had not received
advice and consent.
The Senate's focus in 1905 was to prevent recess appointments
except in cases where the Senate's advice and consent could not be
received. Even when the advice and consent of the Senate could not
be received, "the report expressly acknowledges the Senate's recogni-
tion of the Framers' focus on recesses during which it would be harmful
if an office were notfilled.... [F]or the Framers those recesses were the
longer intersession recesses, not the brief intrasession breaks.,
10 6
Although the 1905 Senate Report intended only to counter any at-
tempted appointments during "constructive recesses," its logic is still
applicable and may be extended to the modern debate. The Senate
of 1905 introduced a practical construction, which would only allow
recess appointments when the Senate is unavailable to receive nomi-
nations and the nation would be harmed if the office were not filled.
Today, "[b]ecause... [the] Senate receives presidential nominations
during recesses and can pursue advice-and-consent procedures dur-
ing these recesses, the recess envisioned by the Judiciary Committee
in 1905 is vastly different today, highlighting the diminished need for an
expansive reading of the clause in light of current Senate practices.'
7
In 1959, the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary
commissioned a report on the recess appointment of federal
judges. 8 Although this report did not give a specific opinion as to
the constitutionality of recess appointments, it showed that the proc-
ess had become a "growing concern" for the legislature. 00 The rec-
ommendations even went so far as to suggest a constitutional
amendment to Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 that would prevent the
recess appointment of federal judges."°
The Senate Judiciary Committee also submitted a report regard-
ing recess appointments, in which it recommended the passage of
105 S. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, supra note 103, at 3.
106 Carrier, supra note 13, at 2230.
107 Id. at 2230-31 (emphasis added).
108 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, supra note 96.
109 Id. at III.
110 Id. at 38.
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Senate Resolution 334."l The resolution expressed "the sense of the
Senate," in opposition to the recess appointments of Supreme Court• • 112
justices. While not speaking directly to the constitutionality of re-
cess appointments to the Supreme Court, the Senate report cited
many scholars and news articles, arguing that a recess appointee on
the Court would serve under a "mental shadow of this possibility [of
Senate rejection, which] could impair the sense of total emancipation
from worry over the effects of his decisions in the political community
that life tenure for judges was intended to bestow.'
1 3
The Senate debate regarding Resolution 334 included a record
filled with letters from scholars advising against recess appointments
to the Supreme Court, and recommending that any recess appointee
to the Supreme Court refrain from taking a seat on the bench until
after confirmation. 1 4 Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney warned that the
recess appointment of Justices harms the Senate as well as the Justice:
"Senators called upon to confirm a sitting Justice are under pressures
which they ought not be under; conversely, a Justice sitting without
his appointment confirmed is also subject to subtle pressures which
should not be permitted to exist."
'"
After a great deal of debate, Senate Resolution 334 was passed by a
count of forty-eight to thirty-seven in the Senate. The resolution
stated that:
the making of recess appointments to the Supreme Court of the United
States may not be wholly consistent with the best interests of the Supreme
Court, the nominee who may be involved, the litigants before the Court,
nor indeed the people of the United States, and that such appointments,
therefore, should not be made except under unusual circumstances and
for the purpose of preventing or ending a demonstrable breakdown in
the administration of the Court's business.""
While non-binding, the resolution clearly expressed the Senate's dis-
pleasure with President Eisenhower's use of the recess appointment,
and allowed senators to voice their constitutional concerns. Senator
Ervin succinctly summarized the concerns of the Senate, articulating
his view that "it is somewhat inconsistent with the spirit of the third
I S. REP. No. 86-1893 (1960).
112 S. Res. 334, 86th Cong., 106 CONG. REC. 10, 12761 (1960) ("[lIt is the sense of the Senate
that the making of recess appointments to the Supreme Court... should be avoided except
under most unusual and urgent circumstances.")
113 Arthur Krock, Judicial Appointments in Absence of Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1959, at A32
(reprinted with S. Res. 334, 86th Cong., 106 CONG. REc. 10, 12761 (1960)).
114 106 CONG. REc. 14, 18132 (1960).
115 106 CONG. REc. 14, 18134 (1960).
116 S. Res. 334, 86th Cong., 106 CONG. REC. 14, 18145 (1960).
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article ... for a judge to make decisions when he does not occupy his
office for life."'1
Since the end of the Eisenhower administration, no President has
used the recess appointment power to appoint a Justice to the Su-
preme Court and the power has been used sparingly with regard to
the lower courts. The lack of recess appointments has led to a de-
crease in congressional discussion of the issue. When Presidents have
used the recess appointment power, however, there has been vehe-
ment objection by the Senate. Through the introduction of non-
binding resolutions and attempts to establish statutory limits on tem-
porary appointments, the Senate has repeatedly voiced its discontent.
These resolutions illustrate a "desire for a standard to limit the scope
of the clause, but do little to provide constitutional justification for
the limits the resolutions propose....
President Clinton's recess appointment of Roger Gregory to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals drew sharp criticism from Senate re-
publicans." 9 Most recently, Senate democrats, led by Senator Ken-
nedy, actively fought against the recess appointment of Judge Pryor
to the Eleventh Circuit. On March 5, 2004, Senator Kennedy wrote
to the Eleventh Circuit expressing doubts regarding the constitution-
ality of recess appointments to the federal bench and requesting that
the court raise the issue sua sponte. When the court chose not to
respond sua sponte, Senator Kennedy pursued the issue by submit-
ting an amicus brief.'
2'
As an institution, the Senate has much to lose in the recess ap-
pointment debate. If Presidents can make appointments without ad-
vice and consent, the constitutional role and power of the Senate will
be greatly diminished. Although the Senate has rarely expressed uni-
fied displeasure with this executive action, senators outside the Presi-
dent's party have been vocal in decrying the use of the recess ap-
pointment power as an infringement upon minority rights and a
117 106 CONG. REc. 14, 18143 (1960).
11 Carrier, supra note 13, at 2232.
119 See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, Senate Confirms 3 BushJudges, WASH. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al
(regarding republican senators' negative reaction to the 2000 Gregory recess appointment by
Clinton, and Gregory's later support from Bush and approval by the Senate).
120 Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, supra note 33.
1 See Brief for United States Senator Edward M. Kennedy as Amicus Curiae, Pro Se, Suggest-
ing Lack of Jurisdiction on the Ground that Judge Pryor's Appointment to This Court is Un-
constitutional, Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated, 358 F.3d 828 (11th
Cir. 2004), affd en banc, 386 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 00-15783); United States v. Drury,
344 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 2003), affd, 396 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 02-12942); United
States v. $242,484.00, 318 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003), affd en banc, 389 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir.
2004), affdpercuriam, 131 F. App'x 130 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-16485) (en banc order issued
by the Eleventh Circuit found motion to file brief, filedJune 10, 2004, untimely).
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violation of the separation of powers. 22 This reaction implies that the
Recess Appointments Clause itself has been co-opted. Instead of serv-
ing to ensure continuity in federal offices, both parties have used it
for partisan advancement.
III. EVALUATION BY THE JUDICIARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RECESS APPOINTMENTS TO ARTICLE III COURTS
While the interpretations of the executive and legislative branches
of government are important in assessing the validity of recess ap-
pointments to the federal bench, the final determination as to consti-
tutionality will most likely be made by federal judges. The judiciary
has signaled its opinion on the merits of recess appointments in three
forms: out-of-court statements, practice, and legal opinions.
A. Statements by the Judiciary
Judicial independence was a principle that the Founding Fathers
extolled in the Declaration of Independence. The Founders believed
that the King's control harmed the colonial judiciary, making
" U]udges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries. 1 23 The importance of
judicial independence derived from 'judicial tenure of office during
good behavior" was espoused by one of our greatest judges, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall.1
2 4
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges prohibits judges
from commenting on pending or impending cases. 25 "The courts
will be silent until a case is brought."26 These restrictions have stifled
much of the judicial response to recess appointments. Nonetheless,
statements made by members of the federal judiciary clearly show
that lifetime tenure and guaranteed compensation are highly valued
protections and are cherished as a means of ensuring independence
at all levels of the federal judicial system, from district courts to the
Supreme Court.
122 See infra Part IV.
123 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
124 Fordham & Husted, supra note 1, at 60.
12- See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3, Section A(6), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html (providing that ajudge should avoid comment-
ing publicly on any pending case or action).
126 Mayton, supra note 18, at 541 (citingJudge Norris, dissenting in United States v. Woodley,
751 F.2d 1008, 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Because the judicial branch is passive, it cannot react to
an assertion of power by the political branches until third parties present the courts with a con-
crete case or controversy. Judicial silence simply cannot be construed as judicial acquies-
cence.")).
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The Founders ardently defended the importance of lifetime ten-
ure as a guarantor of judicial independence. 2 1 Many of these eight-
eenth century arguments are echoed by judges today. Chief Judge
Thomas I. Vanaskie of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, echoes the Founders by arguing that the ju-
dicial independence granted by lifetime tenure not only protects the
judiciary's role as a check upon the other branches of the federal
government, but also preserves the rights and liberties of individu-
als.128 The importance of'judicial independence as both a public and
private right should lead to special scrutiny when actions infringe
upon that independence.
Judges have also recognized the importance of guaranteed com-
pensation in ensuring judicial independence.2 9 Judge Bobby R. Bal-
dock of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
emphasized the role of guaranteed compensation and lifetime tenure
in ensuring the judiciary's independence. 130  The threat to judicial
independence posed by congressional authority over judicial salary is
evident in the instructive example of magistrate judges. Magistrate
judges, who lack guaranteed compensation, have asserted that their
independence is threatened by a lack of Article III protections."'
Given the importance placed upon an independent judiciary-
free from control by the executive or legislative branches-the ques-
tion arises as to how strongly the judiciary might respond to the re-
cess appointment of judges lacking Article III protections were they
not restrained by the canons of the Judicial Code of Conduct.
132
B. Practice of Federal Judges Regarding Recess Appointments
The vast majority of recess appointees have declined to issue or
sign decisions prior to confirmation. In Professor William Mayton's
review of non-Supreme Court recess appointments, he found that
roughly sixty-nine percent of recess appointees to the lower courts
127 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that, in order to remain distinct from the legislature, judges must have permanent
tenure).
28 Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 745, 759-60 (2001) (discussing the value ofjudicial independence).
1 See, e.g., id. at 753 (noting Alexander Hamilton's belief that guaranteed compensation is
key to judicial independence).
130 See Discussion of Judicial Independence, supra note 4, at 356 (quoting Judge Baldock's belief
that thejudiciary's "independence com[es] largely from the constitutional provisions regarding
life tenure and guaranteed compensation").
131 SeeA Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 292-93 (1993)
(discussing cases that address the constitutionality of magistrate judges and the right of litigants
to an Article IIjudge).
32 See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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had not heard or decided cases prior to their appointment.1 3 3 From
1796 until 1828, no recess appointee heard a case prior to confirma-
tion.1" From 1828 until 1891, only six heard cases before confirma-
tion.' 35 The twentieth century saw a steady increase in those judges
willing to hear cases prior to confirmation. 
13
The reluctance of judges who received recess appointments to
hear cases would be irrelevant to the evaluation of the constitutional-
ity of such appointments, but for the reliance of proponents of recess
appointments upon historical practice.13 Emphasizing historical ac-
ceptance by citing the number ofjudicial recess appointments fails to
appreciate the full measure of judicial reaction.
Justices recess appointed to the Supreme Court have shown a re-
luctance to hear cases while lacking Article III protections, and with
the knowledge that they will be subjected to Senate inquiry. Chief
Justice Warren was recess appointed to the Court on October 2, 1953.
While Brown v. Board of Education'18 was originally scheduled for rear-
gument on October 12, 1953, the case was rescheduled for argument
on December 8, 1953.139 The Brown decision was not announced until
after Chief Justice Warren was confirmed by the Senate on March 1,
1954.4' "Thus, whatever the southern Senators may have thought
Warren's views on desegregation would be, they could not make an
issue of them at the confirmation hearings.'
41
Similar delays followed the recess appointment of Justice Bren-
nan. In the cases of Jencks v. United States 2 and United States v. E.L du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 43 no decisions were announced until after Jus-
tice Brennan's confirmation.
1 4 4
[T]he motivation for the delay in the Brown, du Pont, and Jencks cases
might have been a desire to immunize Chief Justice Warren and Justice
133 Mayton, supra note 18, at 540.
13 Id. at 541.
135 Id.
136 Id. This increase may be related to the shifting intent of appointments from filling vacan-
cies expediently to intentionally bypassing Congress. See Common Legislative Encroachments
on Executive Branch Authority, supra note 66, at 257 (stating that the presidential power to
make recess appointments is an important counterbalance to the Senate's power).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying largely on
historical evidence to conclude that judicial recess appointments are constitutional); Curtis,
supra note 21, at 1773-91 (using historical evidence of recess appointments to support a conclu-
sion favoring the constitutionality of recess appointments).
138 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139 Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REV.
124, 140 (1957) [hereinafter Constitutional but Unwise?].
140 Id. at 141.
141 Id. at 140.
142 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
143 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
I" See Constitutional but Unwise?, supra note 139, at 141.
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Brennan from possible strong attacks .... [S]o long as there is a chance
that the Court will be motivated by concern over the repercussions of
their opinions in the Senate, the independence of the judiciary is im-
paired. There is little doubt that the recess appointee himself does not
have the requisite independence of article III, and that he must consider
the possible effects of his action on the Senate and on the defeated liti-
gants or disgruntled parties who may appear before the Judiciary Com-
mittee.
145
An additional factor in judicial reaction to recess appointments is
the strain that a recess appointment places on a judge's professional
and personal life. One of the benefits of lifetime tenure and guaran-
teed compensation is that a judge will never have to worry about fu-
ture clients or moving his or her family because of work require-
ments. Recess appointees do not enjoy these benefits. Candidates
for recess appointments, "'especially out-of-towners with families to
move, often say they would prefer waiting around for confirmation
rather than risk losing the new appointment after little more than a
year on the job. '" '"
C. Legal Opinions Regarding the Constitutionality of Recess Appointments to
the Federal Bench
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that when a court is im-
properly constituted, its decisions cannot stand. This is true even
where judges possess Article III protections. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority in United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., '
found that where a senior judge improperly participated in an en
banc court of appeals' proceeding, the judgment must be vacated.
148
Having a properly constituted court, with the protections of Article
III, is so important that a unanimous three-judge opinion must be va-
cated if one of the three judges lacked Article III protections.
149
Most early recess appointments to the federal bench were the sub-
ject of little contention. Appointments were made as a matter of
convenience, with no intent to circumvent Senate approval. Addi-
tionally, since many recess appointees did not hear cases prior to
145 Id. at 142.
146 Louis FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERALJUDGES CRS-12
(Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with Congressional Research Service), available at http://
www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31112.pdf (quoting A] Kamen, The Recess Ap-
pointment Game, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1996, at All).
147 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
48 Id. at 691.
149 See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (vacating judgment of a three-judge panel
despite the fact that two judges constituted a quorum).
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Senate confirmation, there were few litigants who could challenge
decisions by recess appointees. 5 0
In 1899, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Ward,'5' prohibited collat-. . . . .. 152
eral review of judicial decisions by recess appointees. This decision
found that a recess appointee is a de facto officer "acting with the
color of authority, [so that his decisions,] even if he be not a good of-
ficer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked.' '153 Following this
ruling, "that the courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a
trial by a recess appointee violated Article III, no such cases would
likely be brought. None were, until the jurisdictional objection was
eliminated and the stir generated by the Eisenhower appointees
brought the right to the fore.'5 4
In the 1962 opinion of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 55 the Supreme Court
erased the bar against collateral challenges it had established in Ex
parte Ward. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok recast the question of whether a
judge was in possession of the protections of Article III as a jurisdic-
tional question that could be addressed at any time. 15 6 This ruling al-
lows litigants to question the jurisdictional authority of judges who
lack Article III protections. Under the Court's new standards, when a
case is heard by a judge who lacks Article III protections the ruling is
invalid and must be vacated.
1
5
7
150 See Mayton, supra note 18, at 520 ("Of the twelve recess-appointments to the Court prior
to the Eisenhower appointees, only two had heard cases prior to their confirmation.").
151 173 U.S. 452 (1899).
152 Id. at 456.
153 Id.
14 Mayton, supra note 18, at 541-42.
15 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
156 See id. at 584 (holding that a judge of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals could in fact hear a criminal case because such judges possessed the protections of Article
III). See also Recent Case, Constitutional Law-President Has Power to Issue Recess Commission to Fed-
eral Judge Ven Vacancy First Arises During Session of Senate, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 364, 365 (1963)
(stating that Glidden "cast considerable doubt on the continuing validity of Ex parte Ward" and
that the "[Allocco] court rejected the applicability of the defacto doctrine" to the subject of recess
appointments to the federal bench).
J57 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding
that Congress may not delegate Article III powers to a non-Article III court, in this case particu-
larly referring to the bankruptcy courts); see also United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363
U.S. 685 (1960) (concluding that when an appeals court panel is improperly constituted, the
decision of the panel is void). The Supreme Court most recently addressed the necessity of a
properly constituted judiciary as a private right of litigants in Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69
(2003). Justice Stevens delivered the Court's opinion regarding a criminal appeal in which an
"Article IV" judge (lacking Article III protections), appointed to the Northern Mariana Islands
sat on a 9th Circuit panel with two judges who possessed the protections of Article III. Id. at 71.
The presence of a non-Article III judge on a circuit panel was found to violate the statutory re-
quirements of a properly constituted panel, even if the panel decision was unanimous. See id. at
76 n.9 (finding it unnecessary to evaluate the constitutional questions regarding Article III pro-
tections when a clear statutory violation exists).
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Despite these decisions mandating Article III protections, three
circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of recess appoint-
ments to the federal bench.1 5 8 While these decisions dominate the
discussion of this issue, each was made over strong dissents or aca-
demic criticism.
The Supreme Court has not yet signaled approval or disapproval
of the findings of the circuit courts. On March 21, 2005, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in Evans v. Stephens.19 Justice Stevens,
writing respecting the denial, left the door open for future challenges
to the legitimacy of recess appointments to Article III courts:
This is a case that raises significant constitutional questions .... [T]here
are legitimate prudential reasons for denying certiorari in this somewhat
unusual case. That being said, it would be a mistake to assume that our
disposition of this petition constitutes a decision on the merits of whether
the President has the constitutional authority to fill future Article III va-
cancies, such as vacancies on this Court, with appointments made absent
consent of the Senate during short intrasession "recesses."
160
Despite the Supreme Court's hesitancy in Evans v. Stephens to rule on
the legitimacy of the recess appointment of Judge Pryor, Justice Ste-
vens recognized the constitutional question raised, and indicated that
if additional recess appointments are made, the Supreme Court may
hear challenges to their constitutionality. 61
The three circuit court opinions on this subject rely on several
false analyses in concluding that recess appointments are constitu-
tional. First, they rely on a mistaken textual analysis. Second, the ma-
jority opinions do not recognize the importance of an independent
judiciary, misread the legislative history, and misinterpret legislative
non-objection as implicit approval. Third, the opinions place far too
great an emphasis on historical practice as evidence of de facto con-
stitutionality, relying upon a historical record devoid of abuse as evi-
dence of constitutionality. This reliance on historical evidence also
mistakenly reads a guarantee against future abuse from the assertion
that, historically, recess appointments have not been abused. Fourth,
the early opinions affirming the President's right to make recess ap-
pointments to the federal bench have created a cascade effect, which
has limited the constitutional analysis, and resulted in opinions that
158 Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1640 (2005);
United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.
1985); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
159 Evans, 125 S. Ct. at 1640.
160 Evans v. Stephens, 125 S. Ct. 2244 (2005) (Stevens,J., annotating a prior denial of writ of
certiorari).
161 Id. ("[I]t would be a mistake to assume that our disposition of this petition constitutes a
decision on the merits.... ").
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fail to question the underlying values and constitutionality of recess
appointments to the federal bench.
1. Mistakes in Textual Analysis
The circuit court's textual analysis has strained mightily to fit the
recess appointment power, as exercised in the cases before them, into
a constitutionally acceptable form. While recognizing the inherent
"tension between Article III and the recess appointment of judges to
Article III courts," these courts have reached for ways to reconcile the
clauses. 62 Evans allowed a violation of Article III's requirements in
the case of Judge Pryor's appointment on the grounds that "what
might be intolerable, if prolonged, was acceptable for a relatively
short while.' ' 163 This analysis may be acceptable if an independent ju-
diciary is seen as a purely public right. However, the guarantee of an
independent judiciary also stands as a private right held by litigants. 64
An individual litigant has little concern over a judge's tenure;
what is important is impartiality. A litigant has a private right to en-
sure that the judge in his or her case will not be influenced by con-
gressional or executive criticism. It is a breach of a judge's Article III
independence "if his every vote, indeed his every question from the
bench, is subject to the possibility of inquiry in later committee hear-
ings and floor debates to determine his fitness to continue in judicialfi ,0165
office. A sitting judge should not be forced to work with "one eye
over his shoulder on [the] Congress"'166 that must confirm him, and
the other eye fixed on a President who can pull his nomination from
the floor.
By relying on the acceptance of state court judges who sit without
the protections of Article III, the Evans court mistakenly extrapolates
that "we can readily accept that the Framers would tolerate, on a
temporaFy basis, some federal judges who lack[] Article III protec-
tion [s] ."".. This jump is implausible. Would the Framers tolerate
temporary elected judges because states electjudges? This defies our
federal system.
I62 Evans, 387 F.3d at 1223.
163 Id. at 1224.
164 See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
I Henry M. Hart, Jr., Prof. Hart's Letter, HARV. L. SCH. REC., Oct. 8, 1953, at 2, quoted in
United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing ChiefJustice Warren's appointment prior to Brown v. Board of Education).
6 Paul Freund, HARV. L. SCH. REc., Oct. 8, 1953, at 1, quoted in Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014
(Norris, J., dissenting).
167 Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224.
JOURNAL OF CONS TITUTIONAL LAW
Several core questions arise from a textual analysis of the Recess
Appointments Clause. 168 First, when does a vacancy "happen during
the recess?" Second, what constitutes "the recess?" In textual analy-
sis, it is also important to consider a clause's function. Is the clause
meant as an exception to the general rule or part of the normal con-
stitutional order? If a clause is an exception, its impact should be less
expansive.
The Recess Appointment Clause, as a deviation from standard proce-
dures, should be read no more expansively than its purpose requires.
That makes it legitimate, despite the constant text, to conclude that in-
trasession appointments are permissible for executive branch appointees
but not for judges, or even that recess appointments of judges are im-
permissible altogether.
169
There are two competing interpretations of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause regarding when a vacancy must arise to be eligible for a
recess appointment. A broad interpretation would allow appoint-
ments during a recess to any existing vacancy; a more narrow inter-
pretation would limit recess appointments to only those vacancies
that first arise during the recess. Without a great deal of scrutiny,
each of the three circuit courts analyzed the text, finding that the
phrase "vacancies that may happen during the recess" implies a
presidential right to fill those vacancies that exist during a recess
whether they arose during that recess or not.7° By adopting this
broad construction, the courts confer greater authority on the Presi-
dent."'
The alternative interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause
reads the clause as prohibiting recess appointments except where va-
cancies first arise during that recess. Despite the decisions of the cir-
cuit courts, such a reading has strong support from "the more obvi-
ous reading of the words, canons of construction about not rendering
words to be surplusage, and other constitutional clauses that use the
same language.12
The decision in Evans v. Stephens to sanction the use of the Recess
Appointments Clause during an intrasession recess is contradicted by
a textual analysis of the clause. "The use of the plural term Vacancies
468 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (defining the Recess Appointments Clause); see also supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
1 Herz, supra note 19, at 453.
170 See United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1962) (using a practical interpreta-
tion of the intent of the clause); Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1012 (relying upon historical use and a
belief that an alternate interpretation would conflict "with a common sense reading of the word
happen"); Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226 (citing Altocco and Woodley).
171 See Rappaport, supra note 12, at 14 (explaining that under a broad interpretation, the
President can "make a recess appointment whenever there is a vacancy during a recess, irre-
spective of when the vacancy first arose").
72 Id. at 17.
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in the Recess Appointments Clause suggests that the Framers deliber-
ately chose the singular form of the term Recess.', 173 This interpreta-
tion that the clause refers only to intersession recesses is supported by
other clauses in the constitution. The original constitutional provi-
sion to fill vacancies in the Senate allowed a governor to make a tem-
porary appointment "during the Recess of the [State] Legislature.' 74
In addition, if the Framers intended to include intrasession recesses
they could have employed a term used elsewhere in the Constitution:
"adjournment.1 75
The lack of debate by the Framers surrounding the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause also lends credence to the theory that they did not
intend intrasession recess appointments, approved in Evans v.
Stephens. The constitutional debates illustrate a careful balancing be-
tween the power of the President and the Senate with respect to ap-
pointments. Recess Appointments fundamentally alter the balance of
power between the branches, enabling the President to appoint with-
out consent and gain concessions on permanent nominees. The Re-
cess Appointments Clause was approved with minimal debate because
it was not intended to alter the balance of power. The Clause was to
operate during the long intersession recesses of the early Congress
and not during those times when the Senate was available. "That the
Framers intended to give the President such a loophole to escape the
normal system of checks and balances in the appointment process
seems unlikely in light of the minimal impact the Framers intended
the clause to have on the system of checks and balances.'
176
The textual interpretations of the constitutional provisions for re-
cess appointments and Article III judicial independence do not cre-
ate a clear conclusion for the proper balance of the two provisions.
The carefully constructed constitutional language of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause deserves a more searching textual inquiry than
any court has provided to date. In the end, the "possible textual in-
terpretations are neither conclusive nor obvious from the language of
the provisions. The conflict between the plain language and appar-
ent requirements of articles II and III may be resolved only by look-
ing beyond the text.'
177
A vital aspect of this inquiry beyond the text is the conflict be-
tween the Framers' desire for efficiency embodied in the Recess Ap-
173 Carrier, supra note 13, at 2219 (emphasis omitted). But see Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Ap-
pointments of Article lIJudges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377, 411 (2005)
(contending that "[t] here are substantial difficulties with these textual arguments").
74 Carrier, supra note 13, at 2220 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 2).
175 Id. at 2220-21.
176 Id. at 2227.
177 Virginia L. Richards, Note, Temporary Appointments to the FederalJudiciary: Article I Judges?,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 712 (1985).
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pointments Clause and the importance of an independent judiciary
affirmed by Article III.
Given that the language of the two clauses is in conflict and that the in-
tentions of the Framers are unclear, the principles that animate the salary
and tenure provisions of Article III-judicial independence and separa-
tion of powers-clearly outweigh the concerns of expediency and effi-
ciency that underlie the Recess Appointments Clause. In other words, if
we were writing on a clean slate, if we were reviewing Judge Heen's recess
commission without history to support it, I find it inconceivable that we
would interpret the Constitution as the majority does today-
subordinating Article III values to the executive's general power to make
recess appointments.
17
8
2. The Importance of an Independent Judiciary and the Misreading of
Legislative History
Judges sitting by recess appointment lack one of the most vital as-
pects of judicial authority. "There is a broad sense that a recessed
appointee, even though officially and legally in the job, just doesn't
carry the aura of someone given the Senate stamp of approval."179 As
has often been noted, judges have no army or police force to enforce
their decrees. They rely entirely upon the other branches and the re-
spect given their position to ensure enforcement. If the judiciary is to
be an effective force for societal order, it is imperative that its reputa-
tion be protected. Because recess appointees "would be making deci-
sions with the prospect of a potential vote on their confirmation, de-
cisions made by recess appointees may reflect a focus on personal
political gain. The judiciary cannot afford this appearance of im-
propriety.
The importance of an independent judiciary has been stressed
throughout American history.'8' Yet the opinions upholding recess
appointments of federal judges do little to address the potential lack
of independence that recess appointees may possess. The temporary
nature and lack of security held by recess appointees demonstrates
"circumstances [that] are utterly at odds with the commitment to ju-
dicial independence reflected in Article III's good behavior clause
and salary protections.'
8 2
178 United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris,J., dissenting).
179 Kamen, supra note 146, at All.
180 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 26 CARDoZO L. REV. 543, 567 (2005).
181 See, e.g., Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1018 (examining the Framers' early goal of an independent
judiciary).
182 Herz, supra note 19, at 450.
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In examining the purposes of Article III, the Supreme Court has
found both a public and a private function. The public function of
courts is structural, serving to check "the other parts of government
as they might try to expand their power beyond constitutionally as-
signed limits." 1 83 The judiciary of the United States is often asked to
uphold the separation of powers both between the competing
branches of government, and between the federal government and
the states. In order to ensure that this task is properly carried out,
Article III eliminates controls that the executive and legislative
branches may have over the judiciary. Recess appointments reinstate
these executive and legislative controls, making judges dependent on
competing branches of government for salary as well as continuance
in office.
As important as Article III's public/structural purpose is to the
separation of powers, the private right granted by Article III is even
more vital to individual liberty and our faith in a fairjudiciary. "That
inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution,
and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the
courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold
their offices by a temporary commission.'1 4  Lifetime tenure and
guaranteed compensation create a "'personal guarantee of an inde-
pendent and impartial adjudication .... , This private right guar-
antees that litigants will "'have claims decided before judges who are
free from potential domination by other branches of government.'"
8 6
Commentators who support the constitutionality of judicial recess
appointments have equated a judge's life tenure to constitutional
provisions regarding six-year Senate terms and the President's four-
year term, noting that there are exceptions to these provisions. 
7
Such a comparison misses the vital importance of lifetime tenure in
the constitutional scheme. While a term of six years versus a term of
five years may have some limited impact upon a senator's voting, and
therefore public rights, this impact is miniscule compared to the dif-
ference between life tenure and a temporary appointment. Further-
183 Mayton, supra note 18, at 528 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 847 (1986)).
184 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
185 Mayton, supra note 18, at 528 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 478 U.S. at
847)).
186 Id. at 529 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 478 U.S. at 847).
187 Hartnett, supra note 173, at 440 ("But unless one thinks that life tenure for Article III
judges is somehow more central to the constitutional scheme than two year terms for Article I
Representatives, six year terms for Article I Senators, and four year terms for Article II Presi-
dents, it should be no more troubling that some Article III judges lack life tenure than that
some Representatives have terms shorter than two years, some Senators have terms shorter than
six years, and some presidents have terms shorter than four years.").
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more, the value of an independent judiciary in the constitutional
framework relies on life tenure in a way that other offices do not.88
Critics of the importance of life tenure have cited the Constitu-
tion's failure to prevent lower court judges from aspiring to higher
positions. s9 While judges with lifetime appointments may continue
to exhibit aspirations for higher office, the lifetime tenure provision's
most important aspect is its guarantee of permanentjob security.90
The three appellate court opinions regarding the recess appoint-
ments of federal judges'9' provide very little discussion of how to
balance the inherent conflict between the Recess Appointments
Clause and the importance of lifetime tenure and guaranteed com-
pensation. While "[t]he contemporaneous writings of the Framers
are virtually barren of any references to the Recess Appointments
Clause[,] ... the historical record is a cornucopia of references to the
principle of life tenure enshrined in Article 11.,192 Given the impor-
tance of judicial independence to the Founding Fathers, who stated
their dissatisfaction with English judges prominently in the Declara-
tion of Independence, 9 3 it is reasonable to assume that had they in-
tended the recess appointment power to undercut the Senate's role
of advice and consent, the topic would have been seriously debated.
The legislative histories of the conflicting provisions provide
strong support for either of two conflicting interpretations: "that the
recess appointments clause was intended as a limited exception to Ar-
ticle III's tenure and salary provisions, or that the tenure and salary
provisions are absolute requirements and the recess appointments
clause was therefore not intended to extend to vacancies in the fed-
eraljudiciary.'' 194 In either case, this conflict deserves more discussion
than the gloss-over provided by the three opinions to address this
conflict.'9'
188 See FISHER, supra note 146, at CRS-16 ("Moreover, it could be argued that the Constitution
,guarantees litigants a trial before lifetime judges.'") (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, supra note 96, at iii).
189 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 173, at 440 (describing the aspirations of judges and justices
despite life tenure).
,90 Id. Hartnett may be correct in citing Bruce Springsteen that "Poor man wanna be rich,
rich man wanna be king, And a king ain't satisfied till he rules everything." Id. (quoting Bruce
Springsteen, Badlands, on DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN (Sony Records 1978)). However,
the power of ambition to influence decision pales in comparison to the need for security.
191 SeeEvans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d
1328 (9th Cir. 1984), revd en bane, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Allocco, 305
F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
192 Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1017-18 (Norris,j., dissenting).
19s THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
194 Curtis, supra note 21, at 1773.
195 See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1220; Woodley, 726 F.2d at 1328, rev'd en bane, 751 F.2d at 1008; Al-
locco, 305 F.2d at 704.
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The undermining of the Founders' ideal of an independent judi-
ciary was most apparent during the confirmation hearings of Justice
Brennan. Before the Supreme Court, on which Brennan sat as a re-
cess appointee, were several cases regarding the Communist Party.
Justice Brennan tried to avoid speaking about pending cases, but was
pressed by Senator McCarthy:
[Tihe question was simple. You have not been confirmed yet as a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court. There will come before that Court a number
of questions involving the all-important issue of whether or not commu-
nism is merely a political party or whether it represents a conspiracy to
overthrow this Government.
I believe that the Senators are entitled to know how you feel about
that ...196
The specter of a judge ruling on important cases without the pro-
tections of lifetime tenure was also raised by other Eisenhower recess
appointments. Chief Justice Warren was urged not to hear argu-
ments in the Brown v. Board of Education cases while he remained a re-
cess appointee. Harvard Professor Henry Hart wrote that doing so
would "violate the spirit of the Constitution, and possibly also its let-
ter." 97 During this same period, two recess appointees to the Fifth
Circuit chose not to sit on controversial civil rights cases until after
their confirmations. 198
In 1959, the third Eisenhower Supreme Court recess appointee,
Justice Potter Stewart, also faced troubling questions as a sitting Su-
preme Court Justice. During his nomination hearing, Justice Stewart
faced a withering examination by southern senators upset by the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. 99 "That the on-
the-bench performance of a recess appointee will indeed be reviewed
by the Senate is indicated by the confirmation debate on Judge Greg-
ory, where it was noted that 'His performance on the bench since his
[recess] appointment has been uniformly praised.'
20 0
The notion of a sitting Supreme Court Justice or any other sitting
federal judge defending his views and rulings before congressional
scrutiny in order to maintain his position is antithetical to the pur-
196 Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr., 85th
Cong. 18 (1957) (statement of Senator McCarthy), quoted in Constitutional but Unwise?, supra
note 139, at 124.
197 GaryJ. Edles, Temporary Judges: Recent Developments in the United States and Great Britain, 48
FED. LAWYER, July 2001, at 12 (quoting Hart, supra note 165, at 2).
198 Id. at 12.
199 See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS
L. REv. 383, 404-05 (2000) (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S7988 (2001)) (detailing segregationist
senators' questions for Justice Stewart during his hearing before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee).
2W Mayton, supra note 18, at 530 n.51 (quoting 147 CONG. REc. S7988 (2001) (statement of
Senator Leahy)).
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poses of Article III and reveals the troubling potential of recess ap-
pointments.
Recent Supreme Court cases further illustrate the extreme danger
posed by recess appointees to the federal bench. While many com-
mentators questioned the motivations behind the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore,201 the crush of commentary questioning the
motivations of a recess appointee on such a panel would have been
overwhelming. The protections of lifetime tenure and guaranteed
compensation insulated the Court from a great deal of criticism fol-
lowing its decision in the 2000 election. If a recess appointee had
cast the deciding vote in the case, any semblance of political neutral-
ity by the judiciary would have been stripped away.
In a post-September 11th world, the Recess Appointments Clause
has been defended as a necessary mechanism by which judicial conti-
nuity can be assured in a time of crisis.2  In times of great crisis, the
executive and legislative branches react to the immediate concerns of
the nation and its people. While often these reactions do much to
improve the national condition, abuses occur more easily during na-
tional emergencies. With public opinion firmly behind the actions
of the government in a time of crisis, only independent courts have
the ability to consider the constitutionality of arrests and deten-
204tions. Temporary judges, reliant upon a wartime President for
nomination and a wartime Senate for confirmation, may be loathe to
act in a politically unpopular way.
It is vital, when our nation is most vulnerable to the corruption of
national panic, to maintain ajudiciary free from political and popular
influence. The three circuit court opinions that considered this issue
have failed to recognize both the importance of an independent ju-
diciary and the degradation of independence created by recess ap-
pointments.
2 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
202 See, e.g., Randolph Moss & Edward Siskel, The Least Vulnerable Branch: Ensuring the Continu-
ity of the Supreme Court, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 1015, 1021-23 (2004) (arguing for the necessity of
ensuring continuity on the Supreme Court in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack or similar
crisis).
203 See Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L.
REV. 571 passim (2002) (detailing restrictions on civil liberties in the wake of World War II and
the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001).
204 It is important to remember the effects of crisis upon the population. During World War
II, 93% of Americans supported President Roosevelt's decision to intern Japanese-Americans.
See Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 597, 649 n.146 (1993) (citing PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946, at 380 (Hadley Cantril ed.,
1951)).
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3. Historical Practice
Each of the three opinions upholding the constitutionality of re-
cess appointments relies upon the strength of historical practice. As-
suming, arguendo, that historical practice supports presidential re-
cess appointments to the federal bench, the constitutional analysis is
205hardly complete. Historical practice, while persuasive, does not
create constitutional validity. "[T] he federal judiciary must reject any
unconstitutional construction by another branch of government re-
gardless of the number of years the construction has been upheld."
2 0 6
A reevaluation of the constitutionality of recess appointments is
necessary in light of the new purposes recess appointments are serv-
ing. Throughout the last twenty-five years, judicial appointmentsg ... . . 207
have become increasingly politicized. So, too, has the use of recess
appointments. In comparing modern appointments to past recess
appointments, one commentator noted that Chief Justice Earl War-
ren and Associate Justice William Brennan "received their appoint-
ments not because of a constitutional impasse due to the intransi-
gence of a minority of senators, but because it was necessary to have a
full strength judiciary and the recess appointment method permitted
this. '2 0  This comparison of modern and past recess appointments
indicates a shift in underlying purose. Such alteration should spur a
reevaluation of constitutionality.
20
The Supreme Court's willingness to strike down that which it
views as unconstitutional, regardless of how longstanding the practice
may be, is well established.10 The constitutionality of recess ap-
pointments can be seen as a struggle between the concerns for sepa-
ration of powers and efficiency. Even where longstanding-use and
practical-efficiency arguments are present, the Court has found the
211separation of powers an overriding concern.
There are three main limitations on the use of historical practice
as "evidence of a structural accommodation. 2 1 2 First, regardless of
205 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
206 Richards, supra note 177, at 715.
207 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nominations Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 passim
(2005) (examining the sources of recent divisiveness surroundingjudicial nominations).
208 Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39
U. RICH. L. REV 871, 901 (2005) (citing Buck et al., supra note 22, at 4-14).
209 But see Hartnett, supra note 173, at 407 (arguing that we should not abandon the tradi-
tional interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause).
210 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the longstand-
ing practice of segregation in public schools).
211 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 177, at 717 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983))(noting that the Supreme Court in Chadha gave priority to separation-of-powers con-
cerns over considerations of efficiency).
Curtis, supra note 21, at 1783.
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historical practice, "the independent law-declaring function of the
courts stands on its most solid footing when private liberty and prop-
erty rights are at stake., 213 When considering an individual litigant's
private right to have his or her case heard before a fair and impartial
trier of fact, recess appointments fit this category. Second, as in !NS
v. Chadha, congressional and presidential action must stay "within the
broad confines of the constitutional text and structure" to maintain
constitutionality.21 4 In the case of recess appointments, the conflict
between the clauses creates confusion, but the provisions of Article
III are very clear in their requirements. Finally, courts should not
give effect to structural accommodations that do not work.215 While
there has been no constitutional crisis regarding recess appoint-
ments, any court that examines the record can observe a growing dis-
content with the process and anger at its alleged abuse.
The historical record is also mistakenly used, in an argument of
negative implication, as demonstrative of the minimal threat to the
constitutional order posed by recess appointments. Allocco and Wood-
ley both cite a historical record allegedly devoid of executive branch
abuse. 7 The fear that a recess appointee would be a "'lion under the
throne"' of the executive branchIS should not be dismissed on the
slim foundation that such evils have not occurred in the past. By this
reasoning, a future court might find that a recess appointee who was,
in its opinion, unduly influenced by the President lacks jurisdiction
while a similarly situated judge who was not unduly influenced has ju-
risdiction and may exercise Article III powers. As a jurisdictional
question, establishing the Article III credentials of a judge is an initial
hurdle, to be asked prior to any further evaluation of underlying ju-
dicial motives.
The constitutional protections of lifetime tenure and guaranteed
compensation do not exist as a background cause for dismissal if a
judge is unfairly influenced or coerced. They stand, rather, as a
guarantee to all litigants that the judge hearing their case will be in-
dependent from executive and legislative branch influence. By rely-
ing upon arguments such as that of Attorney General Wirt, that re-
cess appointments "cannot possibly produce mischief, without
imputing to the President a degree of turpitude entirely inconsistent
213 Id. (citing Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803)).
214 Id. For example, in Chadha, the Court struck down a longstanding Congressional proce-
dure whereby one house of Congress could exercise a "one-House veto." 462 U.S. at 959.
215 Curtis, supra note 21, at 1784.
216 See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
217 See United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1962), cited with approval in United
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The evils of legislative and executive
coercion which petitioner foresees have no support in our nation's history.").
218 Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014.
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with the character which his office implies, 21 9 the Allocco court misses
the jurisdictional nature of the question. The question is not the
"turpitude" exhibited in a particular case, but the jurisdiction of a
judge without lifetime tenure to hear a matter designated to an Arti-
cle III court.
As the justifications for recess appointments have shifted from en-
suring a functioning judiciary during long intersession recesses to a
presidential tool used to fight what Presidents see as the obstruction-
ist tactics of the Senate,2 0 the courts must also shift their view as to
the potential for abuse.
If the Recess Appointments Clause is read as the appellate courts
have thus far understood it, the President has absolute power to ap-
point judges to fill Supreme Court and lower federal court vacancies
regardless of Article III concerns. These recess appointees then serve
until the end of the "next Session" of Congress. At the end of that
session, the office would again be vacant and the President free to
make another recess appointment.
If discord between the President and Senate were to continue,
and judicial nominations reached an impasse from which neither
branch of government would yield, it is not inconceivable that the
President would bypass the Senate advice and consent altogether and
fill the federal judiciary using the recess appointment power.222 Daisy-
chaining appointments together in this manner would decimate the
independence of the federal judiciary. Attorney General opinions
foresaw the potential of this power and have approved of its constitu-
tionality.223 While a federal judiciary devoid of any Article III protec-
tions and composed entirely of temporary recess appointees may
seem unlikely, it is one logical derivative of the current state of the
law.
219 Allocco, 305 F.2d at 714 (quoting Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies (1823), supra note
43, at 634).
20 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text regarding judicial appointments by Presi-
dent Clinton and President George W. Bush.
221 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
222 While this scenario seems improbable, a smaller scale conflict may be easier to envision.
A President and Senate of different political parties and each ideologically wedded to one side
of a particular issue, such as abortion, may find it impossible to agree upon a single candidate,
leading to a recess appointment.
23 See Mayton, supra note 18, at 544 (noting Attorney General Stanbery's belief that "[als
these appointments are to continue until the end of the next session of the Senate, the Presi-
dent might omit to make any nomination to the Senate, and then, in the ensuing recess, reap-
point the same or other officers, and thus throughout his term of office defeat entirely any par-
ticipation on the part of the Senate" (quoting President's Power to Fill Vacancies (1866), supra
note 53, at 40)). In theory, this scenario could be made even worse by responsive action by the
Senate. It is arguable that the Senate could redefine the length of a "Session" of Congress. The
Senate could reconvene and recess repeatedly to end the term of recess appointees. This action
could again be countered by presidential recess appointments, creating a constitutional crisis.
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The constitutionality of recess appointments to the federal bench
is in need of a fresh evaluation. "[0]ccasional practice backed by
mere assumption cannot settle a basic question of constitutionalri i 1 ,,224 --
principle. A fair evaluation must free itself from the assumed and
exaggerated weight of history and practice, which has prejudiced
scholars and judges in favor of continuing to allow recess appointees
to serve as a special brand of temporary Article IIjudges. However, a
fair appraisal of the competing constitutional principles at work in a
recess appointment would yield a different result, protecting individ-
ual litigants as well as the constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances.
4. Cascade Effect and Failure to Examine Underlying Values
Precedential cascades can occur without intentional harm. A cas-
cade begins when a court of appeals resolves a genuinely difficult
question. A second court relies upon this holding, even if they may
have leaned in another direction. As the precedent builds, a third
court of appeals may disagree with the earlier courts, but "lacks the
confidence to reject the shared view of its two predecessors. Eventu-
ally all circuits come into line .... ,,22 The result of a cascade is that
"[b] ecause all of the courts of appeals are in agreement, the Supreme
Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the issue.,
226
A precedential cascade can be seen in the circuit court opinions
regarding judicial recess appointments. The analysis of the constitu-
tional conflict in United States v. Allocco was brief; it quoted heavily
from and relied in great part upon prior Attorney General opin-
227ions. These opinions built upon one another, relying upon earlier
positions rather than independent analyses.228 Over time, the weight
of earlier opinions took on great significance as "historical practice"
and Attorney General opinions concentrated less on the examination
of conflicting constitutional clauses.
Allocco has since become the authoritative case regarding the pro-
priety of recess appointments. Allocco relied on Attorney General
opinions in support of the court's position and historical practice. In
addition, Allocco claims that "In re Farrow which had affirmed the
President's power to make appointments to vacancies occurring dur-
ing the Senate session, was the only reported judicial decision on the
recess appointments clause.2 29 There are, however, several earlier
24 Hart, supra note 165, at 2.
225 CASs R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 59 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
226 Id.
227 305 F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 1962).
228 See supra Part I.
229 Chanen, supra note 41, at 209; see also In re Farrow, 3 F. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880).
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decisions that call into doubt Allocco's reliance upon In re Farrow, and
the conclusion that judicial acceptance has been absolute. Allocco's
claim that In re Farrow is the only decision regarding recess appoint-
ments is "patently incorrect; the court failed to cite District Attorney,
Peay v. Schenk, or In re Yancey. This omission is a grievous error, for in
that one stroke, Judge Kaufman erased all vestiges of these earlier
,,230
cases.
Subsequent decisions by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, uphold-
ing recess appointments, and the Supreme Court's decision to deny
certiorari have followed the pattern predicted by Sunstein's cascade
theory.2 3 ' As a result of the cascade effect, judicial opinions in this
area rely heavily upon historical acceptance, which itself is called into
doubt by a more thorough analysis.3 2
The opinions of the circuit courts have also relied upon a mis-
guided theory of efficiency. These opinions
failed to consider the competing purposes served by articles II and III
and treated historical practice as the dispositive factor in its analysis.
These serious analytical flaws in both opinions resulted in an abdication
of the courts' position as final arbiter of constitutional meaning. Further,
the 1962 Allocco opinion predated the 1965-1980 recess appointment hia-
tus, recent Supreme Court opinions that criticize a bare "historical con-
sensus" argument, and other Supreme Court opinions that emphasize
233
the fundamental importance of article III protections.
The precedential cascade that extends from the earliest Attorney
General opinions on this subject to the Supreme Court's recent de-
nial of certiorari has prevented a full exploration of the constitutional
conflict between Article III and the Recess Appointments Clause.2 34 If
historical practice were set aside from the recess appointments de-
bate, what would remain is two clauses clearly in conflict.
In comparing underlying values, a litigant's right to a fair and im-
partial trial should trump the justifications given for the recess ap-
pointment power. Efficiency and the ability of the President to expe-
diently choose judges does not rise to the level of a fundamental
right, as does the private right to a fair and impartial trier of fact.
230 Id.
231 See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Woodley and
Allocco approvingly).
232 See supra Part II.B. (discussing the Senate's repeated objections to the President's use of
the recess appointment power).
233 Richards, supra note 177, at 709.
4 But see United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1329 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 751
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the issue to address is the "inherent tension" between the
Recess Appointments Clause and Article III); Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1015 (Norris, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for ignoring the need to balance the constitutional matters in ques-
tion).
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This concern for judges free from legislative and executive influence
becomes even more acute during times of crisis. 35
D. Constitutional Validity of a Sitting Judge Facing Senate Confirmation
Article III's protections of lifetime tenure and guaranteed com-
pensation are intended to operate as a shield. Once appointed, Arti-
cle III judges need not answer to the executive branch, the legisla-
ture, or the electorate. A recess appointee, however, does not possess
these protections. "[B]oth the Court, the appointees, and the Senate
are handicapped by an appointee assuming duties prior to confirma-
,'236tion.
Ajudge who hears cases prior to confirmation is "subject to subtle
pressures which should not be permitted to exist."2 37 While evaluat-
ing the credentials of a sitting recess appointee, the Senate will in all
likelihood examine a recess appointee's record on the bench. Thus,
recess appointments lead the Senate to engage in the very ex-post in-
quiries that Article III was designed to prohibit.1
3
1
The "subtle pressures" Senator Mahoney spoke of in 1960 cause a
corruption of both the public and private rights that Article III was
intended to protect. The public right of an independent judiciary is
referenced repeatedly in the Federalist Papers and in other defenses of
the American constitutional system's reliance on independent
judges. 23 9 The antithesis of independence is displayed when a sitting
judge is forced to answer questions before the Senate, while simulta-
neously acting to appease a President who has the power to withdraw
his nomination.
The unconstitutional nature of questioning a sitting judicial offi-
cer does not only lie in the public right created by Article III and
structural concerns for the checks and balances guaranteed by the
Constitution. Additionally, individual litigants are prejudiced when a
decision contrary to public opinion could place a judge's career and
235 See supra notes 202--04 and accompanying text.
236 106 CONG. REC. 14, 18132 (1960) (statement of E. Blythe Stason, Dean, University of
Michigan Law School).
237 106 CONG. REc. 14, 18134 (1960) (statement of SenatorJoseph C. O'Mahoney).
238 See, e.g., Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of William Joseph Brennan,
Jr., 85th Cong. 17-18 (1957) (statement of William Joseph Brennan, Jr., Nominee to be Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States) (quoting Justice Brennan, then sitting as
a recess appointee, being questioned intensely by Senator McCarthy about whether Commu-
nism "represents a conspiracy to overthrow" the government of the United States).
239 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals .... ").
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current office in jeopardy. A recess appointee "serve [s] at the pleas-
ure of the President and the Senate,"24 reliant upon:
(1) [T]he decision of the President to forward his nomination to the
Senate; (2) the decision of the President not to withdraw the nomination
before it has been acted upon; and (3) the decision of the Senate to con-
firm the nomination. The Senate will be entirely free.., to postpone its
action until near the close of the session in order to see how the new
141
nominee is going to vote.
A temporary recess appointee-at risk for evaluation and punish-
ment by the Senate and President-is in no sense an Article III judge.
"A judge receiving his commission under the recess appointment
clause may be called upon to make politically charged decisions while
his nomination awaits approval by popularly elected officials. Such a
judge will scarcely be oblivious to the effect his decision may have on
the vote of these officials., 242 Therefore, decisions made by judicial
officers acting without Article III protections must be declared un-
constitutional. 4 3
On few other points in the Constitutional Convention were the framers
in such complete accord as on the necessity of protecting judges from
every kind of extraneous influence upon their decisions .... [A
judge] cannot possibly have [the] independence [intended by Article
III] if his every vote, indeed his every question from the bench, is subject
to the possibility of inquiry in later committee hearings and floor debates
to determine his fitness to continue in judicial office.24
IV. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS-ALTERATION
OF SENATE POWER
"Advice and consent" implies an ex-ante evaluation of the qualifi-
cations of ajudicial nominee. The question before the Senate during
traditional confirmation hearings is whether a nominee is fit for ser-
vice on the federal bench. A recess appointment reframes the ques-
tion before the Senate: has the nominee's performance during his
recess appointment been so egregious that the Senate feels it neces-
sary to remove him or her from the bench?
This transition from ex-ante to ex-post review is a dangerous para-
digm shift of questionable constitutional validity. In effect, a vote in
which a recess appointee is not confirmed to a permanent position
240 United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Norris, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).
241 Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1016 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Hart, supra note 165, at 2).
242 United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 751 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1985).
243 Cf, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 83 (2003) (invalidating the judgment of an
improperly constituted Court of Appeals).
244 Hart, supra note 165, at 2.
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amounts to removal without the constitutional protections of im-245
peachment by the House of Representatives and trial by the Senate.
In addition to harming the independence of the judiciary, ex-post re-
view handicaps the Senate and alters the nature of its constitutional
duty.
A. Power of the Senate Diminished
The Senate's position of strength in a traditional confirmation
hearing is diminished in three ways by recess appointments. First, it
is diminished by the fear that a failure to confirm will result in a re-
cess appointment that could embarrass those senators who disagree
with the President.46  Second, the Senate can be forced to consider
nominees on a timetable dictated by the President. Finally, when
evaluating a recess appointee, the endowment effect may push the
Senate toward approval.
To avoid additional recess appointments toward the end of Presi-
dent George W. Bush's first term in office, Senate democrats allowed
votes on twenty-five lower federal court judges.147 While previous ad-
ministrations discussed recess appointment compromises with the
Senate, these agreements did not force the Senate to consider nomi-248
nees. The new agreement may not appear to be of great conse-
quence; it does, however, represent a significant encroachment by
the executive branch into the Senate's agenda.
The endowment effect illustrates the higher value individuals
place on current possessions in comparison to hypothetical pur-
chases. 24' The reluctance to change illustrated by the endowment ef-
fect may provide great advantages in the confirmation of sitting re-
245 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("[A)ll civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (affording the impeachment power to the House
of Representatives); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (affording the power to try impeachments to
the Senate).
246 There is a great deal to be lost politically when the Senate is shown to lack power in com-
parison to the executive branch. See, e.g., Mike Allen, President Outmaneuvers Senator on Base Clos-
ings, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at A6 (describing a recent occurrence of executive action dimin-
ishing Senate strength by way of a recess appointment).
247 See David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692 (2005) (considering instances when recess appointments appear to
be pretext for future nomination for positions on higher courts).
248 See FISHER, supra note 146, at CRS-10-CRS-11 (citing agreements made by Senator Byrd
with the Reagan administration and Senator Mitchell with the administration of George H. W.
Bush).
249 See Russell Korobkin, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and
Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (discussing how the endowment effect
can be useful in legal polity analysis).
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cess appointees. By granting some judges this beneficial position, the
Senate's role is de-emphasized.
As a Senator, John Quincy Adams recognized the tactically advan-
tageous position a nominee holds when he already occupies a pro-
posed post. "'Provisional appointments,' he wrote, might be made
during a recess of the Senate, so that 'when the Senate meet [sic], the
candidates proposed to their consideration are already in possession
of the office to which they are to be appointed."
250
When the role of the Senate is diminished, the role of the Presi-
dent is correspondingly aggrandized. Even if, as some have sug-
gested, the Senate has acquiesced to judicial recess appointments,
this does not cloak recess appointees in a shield of constitutionality,
preventing separation of powers challenges.2 5 1  "The [Supreme]
Court has made clear that the consent of the 'losing' branch does
nothing to validate a shift in power between the legislative and execu-
tive branches.SS
B. Failure of the Separation of Powers-A Shift from Institutional
Competition Between Branches of Government to Political Competition
If recess appointments to the federal bench shift power away from
the Senate and towards the President, why has there been no wide-
spread outcry by the legislative branch against the use of recess ap-
pointments?
In principle, Congress should be wary about recess appointments, which
by their nature reduce the Senate's power and increase the president's.
One would think that it would take what measures it could to undercut
253
the president's power here and so increase its own.
The lack of outrage generated by this presidential assumption of
power is part of a larger shift in the way power is balanced across the
federal government.
The appointment power is one of the many areas in which execu-
tive and legislative power overlap. The precise definition of "advice
and consent" is unclear and allows for variations in the amount of
control and influence exercised by the Senate. Historically, this im-
precise constitutional term has left the Senate and President to de-
250 Mayton, supra note 18, at 516 (quoting JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
THE SENATE: A STUDY ON THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE
255 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1953)) (Harris is incorrectly cited in Mayton; this parenthetical
indicates the correct citation).
251 See supra Part ll.B. (discussing the Senate's repeated objections to the President's use of
the recess appointment power).
252 Levinson, supra note 42, at 958.
253 Herz, supra note 19, at 460.
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bate the terms and conditions of appointments with an eye toward in-
stitutional power.
2 5 4
In recent years, however, the debate over judicial appointments
has concerned partisan politics to a much greater degree than it has
concerned institutional power. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) is
representative of this change in focus. Upon hearing of the Presi-
dent's decision to bypass the Senate, Senator Graham stated that he
"applaud[s] the president's decision to appoint [William] Pryor to
the federal bench.""25 Graham stated that Judge Pryor had been an
"outstanding attorney general" held up by "partisan filibusters of
judges driven by liberal special interest politics." '256 In effect, what
Senator Graham advocated is presidential usurpation of the Senate's
prerogative, a diminution of his own power as a United States sena-
tor. Today, there are few voices in the Senate willing to protect the
Senate's prerogative of advice and consent against presidential en-
croachment, regardless of party.
After the recess appointment of Roger Gregory, no criticism was
heard from Senate democrats criticizing the end-run around their
authority. Despite their silence during the Clinton administration,
Senate democrats now raise their voices in protest against republican
recess appointments to the federal bench. Referring to the appoint-
ments of Judge Pryor and Judge Pickering, Senator Charles Schumer
(D-NY) characterized democrats as having "always felt [recess ap-
pointments] violated the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution."
It is noticeable that despite "always" feeling that recess appointments
violated the Constitution, democrats were universally silent in the
face of a democratic President's use of the Recess Appointments
Clause.
Republican senators have been equally duplicitous regarding the
validity of recess appointments. While Senate republicans showed
great concern for their institutional authority during the Clinton ad-
ministration, no republican senatorial voices have been raised in op-
position to the Bush administration's use of recess appointments.
After President Clinton used a recess appointment to name Judge
Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit, a leading republican senator,
254 See Moe & Howell, supra note 40, at 144 (describing the debate over institutional power).
255 Al Kamen, Planting the Cedes on Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at A23.
236 Id.
257 Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations, WASH. POST, May 19,
2004, at A21.
2 Levinson, supra note 42, at 953 n.148 ("Objections to this unusual ... usurpation of the
Senate's customary say in judicial appointments have been limited to Senate Democrats." (cit-
ing Neil A. Lewis, Bush Seats Judge After Long ight, Bypassing Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at
Al; Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for Second Time, Bush Seats Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at
Al)).
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James Inhofe, announced "that he would block any effort to confirm
Gregory for a lifetime appointment, [and] called it 'outrageously in-
appropriate for any president to fill a federal judgeship through a re-
cess appointment in a deliberate way to bypass the Senate.
25 9
An additional factor in the current debate, and a new avenue for
Senate hypocrisy, is the use of the filibuster. Senate Majority Leader
Bill Frist has called the use of filibusters an "unfortunate break with
more than 200 years of Senate tradition., 260 Frist, who claims to view
the use of filibusters for judicial nominees as intolerable, has gone so
far as to threaten to disallow filibusters under Senate rules, a proce-
dural tactic widely regarded as the "nuclear option. 26'
Claims of institutional protection for the President's right to ap-
point judges ring hollow in light of past proceedings. Judge Richard
Paez of the Ninth Circuit waited more than four years for his confir-
mation by the Senate. Originally nominated by President Clinton in
1996, Judge Paez faced an attempted filibuster to his nomination.
Among those voting against cloture, in an attempt to prevent a vote
and continue a filibuster, were fourteen republicans, including cur-
rent Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist.
2 62
"[T] he President and the Senate have, from time to time, debated
the limits of the Constitutional [Recess Appointments] [C]lause and
what actions are constitutional." 26 ' Rarely, however, in a time of uni-
fied government, defined as one party controlling both the Congress
and presidency, are institutional battles fought. Instead of viewing
the current recess appointment debate in terms of institutional
power, republican senators, "like President Bush, view recess ap-
pointments as one response to the frustrations of Democratic filibus-
ters., 264 When the Congress and the President find themselves at
odds concerning a question of institutional strength and separation
of powers, one branch has traditionally conceded defeat in exchange
for political gain, and that branch has rarely been the executive.
While there are times when Congress and the President do battle for
power, today these battles occur "only when they have been pressed
into the service of someone's independent political agenda, not be-
259 FISHER, supra note 146, at CRS-23 (quoting Neil A. Lewis, Senator Vows He Will Fight Clin-
ton's Judicial Selection, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2000, at A16).
260 Kevin Drum, Resist the Filibuster Fiat, WASH. POST,Jan. 31, 2005, at A21.
261 See Charles Babington, Specter Predicts Turmoil May Grow from Impasse: Senator Blames Both
Sides for Stalemate on Judges, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2005, at A4.
262 See Cloture Motion for Nominations of Marsha L. Berzon and Richard A. Paez, 106th Cong., 146
CONG. REc. S1225 (2000) (voting 85-14 for cloture, the majority brought the nomination to a
vote).
263 Senator Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the Judicial Selection
Process: Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion, But Not to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 467,
481 (2003).
264 Herz, supra note 19, at 460.
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cause of anyone's intrinsic interest in the power of the institutions
themselves. 265
The recess appointment debate is part of a larger reshaping of the
traditional separation of powers, which viewed each branch of gov-
ernment as a competitor for limited power. An updated view of the
separation of powers and institutional competition would depict the
President in his traditional power seeking position, but recognize that
"for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions" Congress is
unlikely to fight against this expansion.66 As such, separation of
power is divided along party lines rather than institutional lines.
Both republicans and democrats would be wise to remember that
the party out of power will not remain the minority forever. "[T] he
participants are all repeat players, who do not know whether their
side is going to control the White House, Congress, both, or neither
at any given point .. 267 Democrats who applauded the use of a re-
cess appointment to place Roger Gregory on the Fourth Circuit now
watch as republicans use this same tactic to empower conservative
judges. "In considering the scope of the [Recess Appointments]
[C]lause... one is perforce behind a sort of Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance. A given interpretation may be good for your team at one
point in history and bad at another. ,
2 68
The institutional realignment of the Senate places party above all
else. The extreme partisanship regarding judicial nominations
graphically illustrates the danger to a proper balance of power that
party loyalty can present. The traditional separation of powers envi-
sions questions of institutional power balancing resolved through the
need by the branches of government to cooperate on other issues. If
party loyalty overrides institutional loyalty, however, little protection
remains for the minority party or the institution they seek to defend.
The role of partisan politics in judicial nominations is not new.269
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Senate quickly dis-
covered the power of confirmation. The Senate's motivation to act
as an institution, asserting itself against executive encroachment, is
not nearly as strong as its motivation to act in a partisan fashion to
ensure nominees of a certain political stripe. "The partisan and con-
stituency interests of individual members of Congress usually prevent
them from acting collectively to preserve congressional power-or,
2 Levinson, supra note 42, at 959.
2 See Moe & Howell, supra note 40, at 132 (stating that Congress and the courts have institu-
tional reasons for not opposing a presidential expansion of power).
267 Herz, supra note 19, at 460.
268 Id. at 443.
269 See, e.g., Constitutional but Unwise?, supra note 139, at 133 ("The opposition party often
used the necessity of confirmation as a political weapon to embarrass the President.").
270 Id.
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what is almost the same thing, to deny authority to the other
branches of government.,
271
Although partisanship was present in earlier times, the extreme
partisanship of the Congress and the politicization of the judiciary
have pushed the institutional balance of power to its breaking point.
[C] ongressional parties have grown more ideologically coherent and par-
tisan as legislative districts have become more homogeneous and prima-
ries have become the dominant means of candidate selection. In recent
years, the center has fallen out entirely: in the 1999 Senate, according to
a respected analysis of congressional voting, every Democrat had an aver-
272age score to the left of the most liberal Republican.
The dearth of moderate voices willing to place institution above
party, even temporarily, has created a predicament in which judicial
intervention is necessary. "While both sides are now playing a statis-
tics game to show the other side behaved worse [by not confirming
presidential nominees], the reality is that both parties were at fault-
each trapped in a cycle of escalating partisanship. ' 27  This politiciza-
tion has not been restricted to the Supreme Court. "The transfor-
mation of the lower court appointment process from one dominated
by considerations of senatorial courtesy to one driven by ideological
objectives has been well documented ....
Despite the forces that appear to prevent the Senate from acting
in its own institutional interests, the Court has been reluctant to in-
tervene in separation of powers questions. It "has essentially left it up
to Congress to protect its own institutional interests against presiden-
tial aggrandizement. 2 7 6 If the Senate acted in its institutional inter-
ests in the way the executive branch does, perhaps the judiciary
271 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2314 (2001).
272 Id. at 2311-12 (citing JAMES G. GIMPEL, FULFILLING THE CONTRACT: THE FIRST 100 DAYS
13-14 (1996); BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA 50 (1995); Richard E. Cohen, A Congress Divided, 32
NAT'LJ. 382, 382 (2000)); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Con-
stitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 43-51
(1999).
273 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 180, at 573; see also Hatch, supra note 263, at 467
(showing that both democrats and republicans have been accused of blocking judicial nomi-
nees).
274 See Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19 (illustrating the fe-
rocious turn that debate over the judiciary has taken). Senator Tom Coburn's Chief of Staff
signaled possible approval of "mass impeachment," although he favored an "easier way" to re-
move judges without the impeachment process: removal by Capitol Police at the end of a term
in which a judge has not lived up to the standards of good behavior. Id. While speaking to the
New York Times, the spokesman for the House Judiciary Committee chairman, F. James Sen-
senbrenner (R-Wis.), stated that "[there does seem to be this misunderstanding out there that
our system was created with a completely independentjudiciary... ." Id.
275 Yalof, supra note 247, at 692 (citing SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERALJUDGES: LOWER
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997)).
276 Moe & Howell, supra note 40, at 171.
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would be correct not to involve itself in these difficult separation of
powers questions. In the context of recess appointments, however,
presidential aggrandizement and senatorial passivity have harmed the
Senate as an institution, as well as individual litigants who appear be-
fore judges lacking the protections of Article III. Regardless of these
harms, the courts have been reluctant to push back against presiden-
tial expansion of power.
The tradition of judicial restraint in the separation of powers
dates back to the founding era. 7  The question before the courts in
the context of recess appointments is more than a pure question of
the separation of powers. Although recess appointments are an issue
within the larger context of institutional power balancing, the core
issues regarding recess appointments are in fact constitutional. Ap-
proaching the constitutional conflict between Article III and the Re-
cess Appointments Clause as a question of the balance of power be-
tween the Senate and President, without consideration of the
unconstitutional effects of this laissez-faire response, allows the judi-
ciary to avoid ruling on a constitutional issue that may cut back the
power of the presidency.
"[T] he original constitutional design was premised on a set of in-
centives that would inexorably lead officials to build empires through
their branches., 27 s This constitutional design that envisioned compe-
tition between the branches has failed, at least in part, and has been
replaced by political 2parties-an institution many of the founders
hoped to discourage.' Throughout American history, political par-
ties have linked officeholders to their "state officials and state par-
ties., 280  This reliance upon the party has been exacerbated by
changes in the political system, such as the primary system, gerry-
mandered districts, and the influence of money on politics, that have
made political independence more difficult.2s' With these new incen-
277 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the system of checks and
balances between the different branches of the government).
278 Levinson, supra note 42, at 958; see also id. at 950 ("The trick is to link the self-aggrandizing
motives of government officials to the power of their branches. Given 'the necessary constitu-
tional means and personal motives to resist encroachments,' Madison argues, the ambitions of
the officials who comprise each of the branches will 'counteract' one another." (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
279 See, e.g., President George Washington, Washington's Farewell Address (1796),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm ("[T]he common and continual mischiefs
of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discour-
age and restrain it.").
280 See Levinson, supra note 42, at 940 (quoting Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278 (2000)).
281 See supra note 272 and accompanying text (claiming that political independence is less
likely today because of developments in the political system of the United States).
[Vol. 8:1
Jan. 2006] RECESS APPOINTMENTS TO 7HE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 111
tives, politicians have endeavored to empire-build along party lines
rather than through institutional alliances.
Political party affiliation ... seems to be a much more important variable
in predicting the behavior of members of Congress vis-.-vis the President
than the fact that these members work in the legislative
branch.... [B] ranch loyalty.., seems to be subordinate to their party af-
filiation or (not unrelated) [to] their constituents' preferences.
The failure of the traditional separation of powers balance has
been especially acute in judicial appointments. "[R] elative to the
stubborn passivity of Congress, it is hard to deny the imperial tenden-
cies of modern presidents.... Because individual presidents can con-
sume a much greater share of the power of their institution than in-
dividual members of Congress, we should expect them to be willing
to invest more in institutional aggrandizement.,1 3 While these fac-
tors are constant in many policy areas, there is an added factor that
leads to presidential aggrandizement in the context of judicial ap-
pointments. Presidents set their agendas "with an eye toward secur-
ing a favorable historical reputation, or 'legacy.' 28 4 "[T]he federal
judges a President chooses may be his most profound legacy."2 8 5 Life
tenure allows judges identified with a particular President to influ-
ence the course of the law for decades to come.
In addition to the unconstitutional nature of recess appointments
as they relate to violations of Article III, recess appointments present
the prototypical dilemma the separation of powers doctrine endeav-
ors to resolve. "When courts do adjudicate separation of powers
cases, they see their primary mission as guarding against the 'en-
croachment' or 'aggrandizement' of one branch at the expense of
the others., 216 Despite the myriad constitutional claims against recess
appointments, and the parallels between the dangers posed by recess
appointments and the institutional weaknesses that separation of
powers jurisprudence endeavors to resolve, the courts have failed toJ281
intervene.
282 Levinson, supra note 42, at 952-53.
283 Id. at 956.
284 Id. (citing Kagan, supra note 271, at 2335).
285 Former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Address to the American Society of Newspa-
per Editors (Apr. 19, 1997), http://www.freecongress.org/centers/Id/jsmp/index.asp.
286 Levinson, supra note 42, at 951 [FN] (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699-700
(1997); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 273 (1991); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1346, 1368 (1994)).
287 See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 125 S. Ct. 1640 (2005) (denying certiorari and showing the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to adjudicate the issue of recess appointments).
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There are many explanations for thejudiciary's reluctance to fight
presidential aggrandizement. It is the President, much more than
Congress, who is instrumental in choosing the federal judiciary. This
position of power allows the executive to choose nominees who will
support presidential power. "[P] residents of all ideological and parti-
san stripes have a common interest at stake ... in putting individuals
on the Court who will uphold and promote the power of the presi-
dency."
28 8
The Senate does not have a corresponding incentive to favor can-
didates who are skeptical of presidential power. "[S]enators are pri-
marily oriented by reelection .... They are only weakly motivated by
concerns about the balance of institutional power.... For the most
part, issues of presidential power are not part of their calculus .... 89
As a result of this imbalance between presidential and senatorial in-
terest in ensuring judicial candidates who favor their institution, "the
best bet, owing largely to the president's control over appointments
and to the court system's profound dependence on the executive for
the enforcement of its rulings, is that courts will ordinarily be suppor-
tive and refrain from imposing serious limits on presidential expan-
sionism.,
290
Recess appointments compound deference to the power of the
presidency. If Moe and Howell are correct and judicial deference to
executive power is related to the role played by the President in judi-
cial appointments, then recess appointments will shift the courts to-
ward even greater presidential deference.29' If influence on the judi-
cial appointment process is seen as a sliding scale ranging from
complete presidential power to complete Senate power, recess ap-
pointments lacking Senate input must be seen as the apex of presi-
dential power. At this apex, it should be expected that appointees
will be extremely deferential towards executive power when evaluat-
ing questions of the separation and balance of power, such as the
question of the constitutionality of recess appointments.
The compounding effect of deference to executive power sug-
gested by recess appointments lends support to the urgency with
which the courts must act against this unconstitutional practice. By
deferrinyjudgment to a later date as the court chose to do in Evans v.
Stephens, the problem will grow more severe as "historical practice"
288 Moe & Howell, supra note 40, at 150.
289 Id.
29 Id. at 153.
291 See id. at 150 ("[Presidents] have the freedom to pick pro-presidential types for the bench
[and] ... they can be expected to behave 'according to type' most of the time. This is enough
to tilt the Court in the president's favor.").
22 Evans, 124 S. Ct. 1640 (denying certiorari).
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and the cascade effect become more forceful .9  If recess appointees
continue to ascend to the federal bench, separation of powers juris-
prudence may become even more deferential to presidential power.
In the face of this increasing problem, the judiciary must act to
protect the Senate's institutional interests, thejudiciary's own interest
in remaining independent from executive and legislative oversight,
and the interests of individual litigants. Although the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have traditionally allowed the Congress and
President to resolve institutional power struggles without intervening,
the politicization of the judicial nomination process and the corrupt-
ing influence of politics upon the traditional separation of powers
calls out for judicial intervention. If the Senate will not protect its
own institutional interests (and prevent an unconstitutional and un-
wise practice), the courts must do so.
CONCLUSION
While the diminished power of the Senate is cause for concern, a
more serious threat is the danger recess appointments pose to judi-
cial independence and the guarantees of Article III. By shifting the
function of Senate judicial confirmation hearings from an ex-ante
evaluation of qualifications to an ex-post review of performance, basic
tenets ofjudicial independence are at risk.
Decisional independence is... crucial to maintaining the rule of law,
which is premised on the notion that no person nor any group of persons
is above the law. What confidence would there be in the judicial branch
if a litigant were to bring a matter before a court with the understanding
that a decision may be made, not on the basis of facts, law, precedent and
logic, but instead on the basis of the external pressures that may be9 294
brought to bear by interest groups?
This threat to judicial independence is not a "threat" in the tradi-
tional sense. A traditional threat is a risk that could potentially result
in harm. In the case of recess appointments, however, the threat
against the independence of the federal judiciary does not represent
a hypothetical future ill but one wherein the harm has already oc-
curred. The threat posed by recess appointments to the federal
bench is the infringement upon litigants' rights as implied by Article
III to have their cases heard before a fair and independent judge. As
such, the mere "threat" to the independence of judges represents an
unconstitutional practice in and of itself.
9 See supra Part III.C.4. (arguing that a cascade effect problem can develop when one circuit
incorrectly rules on an issue and the other circuits follow that reasoning).
Vanaskie, supra note 128, at 765.
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When the President aggrandizes the power of his office and en-
croaches upon the duties of another branch of government, the Su-
preme Court has an obligation to act and ensure proper separation
of powers. Although supporters of presidential power are correct
that recess appointments are a constitutionally created loophole to
advice and consent, that loophole does not apply to Article IIIjudges.
The guarantees of Article III nullify the President's ability to circum-
vent the Senate in the case ofjudicial appointments.
The President may have a valid complaint: the Senate may not
have acted as quickly as he hoped in confirming his nominees. If the
Senate and the President fail to reach an agreement in which the
Senate will act promptly on future nominations, no judicial decision
will save the Senate from its failings. As Justice Jackson stated in his
Youngstown concurrence, "I have no illusion that any decision by this
Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and
timely in meeting its problems.
Valid criticisms of Senate inaction, however, do not imply that the
courts should abandon constitutional rights. Justice Jackson also
stressed that a foundation of our democracy is "that the Executive be
under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary delibera-
tions. Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the
duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up. '' 6 In this case
the Executive must "be under the law" of the Senate's approval or
disapproval of judicial nominations through parliamentary delibera-
tion. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that this constitutional role
of the Senate is not usurped.
Recess appointments harm the judicial and legislative branches of
the federal government, individual litigants, and our constitutional
system. In their zeal to fill the federal bench with philosophically
agreeable judges, both political parties have abandoned prudence
and constitutional principles. Given the failure of the political system
to ensure judicial independence, it is incumbent upon the judiciary
to uphold Article III's lifetime tenure and guaranteed compensation
provisions by finding recess appointments to the federal bench un-
constitutional.
25 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
296 Id. at 655.
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